1. ● Three players together can obtain 1 to share, any two players can obtain 0.8, and one player by herself can obtain zero. ● Then, N= 3 and v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1, 2) = v(2, 3) = v(3, 1) = 0.8, v(1, 2, 3) = 1. Which allocation is in the core of this coalitional game? a) (0,0,0); b) (0.4, 0.4, 0); c) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3); d) The core is empty;

1. ● Three players together can obtain 1 to share, any two players can obtain 0.8, and one player by herself can obtain zero. ● Then, N= 3 and v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1, 2) = v(2, 3) = v(3, 1) = 0.8, v(1, 2, 3) = 1. Which allocation is in the core of this coalitional game? a) (0,0,0); b) (0.4, 0.4, 0); c) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3); d) The core is empty;

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter13: General Equilibrium And Welfare

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13.5P

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