171 Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly, this is represented as a dynamic game. А. True В. False Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly, [8] A moves first while B moves second. А. В. True False (9] Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using backwards induction, B will produce a quantity closest in value to: А. В. С. D. 9 15

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
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need help on question 7-13

Use the following to answer questions (1) - (14): Suppose the local market for flat glass, considered a
homogeneous product, consists of two firms, A and B. The market demand is given as:
Q = 40 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the price.
A's total cost (TC) is: TC, = 6°q4, where q, is the quantity produced and sold by A
B's total cost (TC3) is: TC, = 8q2, where qg is the quantity produced and sold by B
[1]
The market structure these two firms operate in is definitely not monopolistic competition.
A.
True
В.
False
[2]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A produces a quantity closest in value to:
A.
9
В.
11
C.
13
D.
15
[3]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market quantity is closest in value to:
A.
10
В.
13
С.
17
D.
20
[4]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market price is closest in value to:
A.
9
В.
11
C.
15
D.
19
[5]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium B's profit is closest in value to:
A.
8.
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26
[6]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A's profit is closest in value to:
A.
8.
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26
Transcribed Image Text:Use the following to answer questions (1) - (14): Suppose the local market for flat glass, considered a homogeneous product, consists of two firms, A and B. The market demand is given as: Q = 40 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the price. A's total cost (TC) is: TC, = 6°q4, where q, is the quantity produced and sold by A B's total cost (TC3) is: TC, = 8q2, where qg is the quantity produced and sold by B [1] The market structure these two firms operate in is definitely not monopolistic competition. A. True В. False [2] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A produces a quantity closest in value to: A. 9 В. 11 C. 13 D. 15 [3] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market quantity is closest in value to: A. 10 В. 13 С. 17 D. 20 [4] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market price is closest in value to: A. 9 В. 11 C. 15 D. 19 [5] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium B's profit is closest in value to: A. 8. В. 16 C. 20 D. 26 [6] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A's profit is closest in value to: A. 8. В. 16 C. 20 D. 26
Page <
2
>
of 6
+
ZOOM
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,
[7]
this is represented as a dynamic game.
A.
True
В.
False
[8]
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,
A moves first while B moves second.
A.
True
В.
False
[9]
backwards induction, B will produce a quantity closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
5
В.
7
С.
D.
15
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
[10]
backwards induction, the market quantity is closest in value to:
A.
12
В.
15
С.
18
D.
21
[11]
backwards induction, the market price is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
15
В.
10
C.
D.
[12]
backwards induction, A's profit is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
68
В.
52
C.
44
D.
32
[13]
backwards induction, B's profit is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
8
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26
Transcribed Image Text:Page < 2 > of 6 + ZOOM Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly, [7] this is represented as a dynamic game. A. True В. False [8] Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly, A moves first while B moves second. A. True В. False [9] backwards induction, B will produce a quantity closest in value to: Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using A. 5 В. 7 С. D. 15 Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using [10] backwards induction, the market quantity is closest in value to: A. 12 В. 15 С. 18 D. 21 [11] backwards induction, the market price is closest in value to: Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using A. 15 В. 10 C. D. [12] backwards induction, A's profit is closest in value to: Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using A. 68 В. 52 C. 44 D. 32 [13] backwards induction, B's profit is closest in value to: Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using A. 8 В. 16 C. 20 D. 26
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