2. Two individuals have the same income ($100,000), but different potential healthcare expenses. Person A's probability of having $80,000 in healthcare expenses is 0.5 percent. Person B's probability of having $800 in healthcare expenses is 50 percent. Assume your utility is U = VI where I is your income. Calculate each person's expected income and expected utility. Calculate each person's certainty equivalent. What does value of the certainty equivalent tell you about how much each person would be willing to insure against their loss?

2. Two individuals have the same income ($100,000), but different potential healthcare expenses. Person A's probability of having $80,000 in healthcare expenses is 0.5 percent. Person B's probability of having $800 in healthcare expenses is 50 percent. Assume your utility is U = VI where I is your income. Calculate each person's expected income and expected utility. Calculate each person's certainty equivalent. What does value of the certainty equivalent tell you about how much each person would be willing to insure against their loss?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.5P

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