2. You are deciding whether or not to purchase insurance. Your income is $100,000 and the chance of you getting sick is 30%. The insurance company is offering you a coinsurance rate of 0.15 and the utility that you get from your disposable income is U = √Y. If you get sick, your medical bills add up to $80,000. Assume that the insurance company charges the actuarially fair premium, and assume that you would purchase the same amount of medical care whether you are insured or not (i.e. M³ = M¹ = M*). Economic theory predicts that you will purchase insurance if the expected gain in utility from receiving the insurance payout when you are sick is greater than the expected loss in utility from paying the premium and remaining healthy. a. Using an expected utility diagram, show your decision process regarding whether to buy insurance or not. Calculate and then show on the diagram the following: i. Disposable income if you remain healthy and do not purchase insurance Disposable income if you are healthy and have purchased insurance iii. Disposable income if you become ill and have purchased insurance ii.

2. You are deciding whether or not to purchase insurance. Your income is $100,000 and the chance of you getting sick is 30%. The insurance company is offering you a coinsurance rate of 0.15 and the utility that you get from your disposable income is U = √Y. If you get sick, your medical bills add up to $80,000. Assume that the insurance company charges the actuarially fair premium, and assume that you would purchase the same amount of medical care whether you are insured or not (i.e. M³ = M¹ = M*). Economic theory predicts that you will purchase insurance if the expected gain in utility from receiving the insurance payout when you are sick is greater than the expected loss in utility from paying the premium and remaining healthy. a. Using an expected utility diagram, show your decision process regarding whether to buy insurance or not. Calculate and then show on the diagram the following: i. Disposable income if you remain healthy and do not purchase insurance Disposable income if you are healthy and have purchased insurance iii. Disposable income if you become ill and have purchased insurance ii.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.5P

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2. Consider an individual with a current wealth of $100,000 who faces the prospect of a 25% chance of losing $20,000 through theft of her car during the next year. If the person’s utility function is U(X) = ln(X), where X is wealth: a. calculate expected utility without insurance, b. calculate the actuarially fair premium for full insurance, c. calculate expected utility with full insurance at the actuarially fair premium d. calculate the maximum amount the individual would pay for full insurance.
Questions 4 & 5 Michelle owns a house in which she keeps valuables worth 100,000 which can get stolen with probability 1%. She can purchase coverage C of the amount C ∈ [0; 100,000] at premium π = 0.05 dollars for each dollar covered. Her Bernouilli utility function is u(w) = ln(w). Assume she has no other assets. 1. Set up her maximization problem. 2. How much insurance will she choose to buy? 3. How much profits does the insurance company earn on insuring Michelle? 4. Does the fact that the insurance company earn profits mean that Michelle is worse off com-pared to the situation in which she is not insured? Explain what is happening. 5. How much insurance will she buy if insurance companies charge an actuarially fair insurance rate?
3. You are in the market for a used car and decide to visit a used car dealership. Youknow that the Blue Book value of the car you are looking at is between $14,000 and$18,000.a. If you believe the dealer knows as much about the car as you do, how much areyou willing to pay? Why? Assume that you care only about the expected value ofthe car you will buy and that the car values are symmetrically distributed.b. Now you believe the dealer knows more about the car than you do. How much areyou willing to pay? Why? How can this asymmetric information problem beresolved in a competitive market?
Jamal has a utility function U = W1/2, where W is his wealth in millions of dollars and U is the utility he obtains from that wealth. In the final stage of a game show, the host offers Jamal a choice between (A) $4 million for sure, or (B) a gamble that pays $1 million with probability 0.6 and $9 million with probability 0.4. (1) Does A or B offer Jamal a higher expected utility? Explain your reasoning with calculations. (2) Should Jamal pick A or B? Why? I would like help with the unanswered last parts of the questions.
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You are in the market for a used car. At a used carlot, you know that the Blue Book value of the car youare looking at is between $15,000 and $19,000. Ifyou believe the dealer knows as much about the caras you do, how much are you willing to pay? Why?Assume that you care only about the expected valueof the car you will buy and that the car values aresymmetrically distributed.23. Refer to Problem 22. Now you believe the dealerknows more about the car than you do. How muchare you willing to pay? Why? How can this asymmetric information problem be resolved in a competitivemarket?
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