Homework Help is Here – Start Your Trial Now!
Business
Economics
Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 quantity Th 0.50 0.25 0 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 50 100 150 200 I 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 Suppose Jacques and Kyoko form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is $ Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 $137.50 $250.00 $337.50 $400.00 $437.50 $450.00 $437.50 $400.00 $337.50 $250.00 $137.50 0 per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jacques and Kyoko agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jacques's profit is and Kyoko's profit is $ Suppose that Jacques and Kyoko have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly Jacque himself "Kyoko

Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 quantity Th 0.50 0.25 0 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 50 100 150 200 I 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 Suppose Jacques and Kyoko form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is $ Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 $137.50 $250.00 $337.50 $400.00 $437.50 $450.00 $437.50 $400.00 $337.50 $250.00 $137.50 0 per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jacques and Kyoko agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jacques's profit is and Kyoko's profit is $ Suppose that Jacques and Kyoko have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly Jacque himself "Kyoko

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)
7th Edition
ISBN:9781285165875
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw
Chapter15: Monopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 7PA
See similar textbooks
icon
Related questions
Question
100%
 

3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement

Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.
 
 
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.00 2.75 50 $137.50 2.50 100 $250.00 2.25 150 $337.50 2.00 200 $400.00 1.75 250 $437.50 1.50 300 $450.00 1.25 350 $437.50 1.00 400 $400.00 0.75 450 $337.50 0.50 500 $250.00 0.25 550 $137.50 600 Suppose Jacques and Kyoko form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jacques and Kyoko agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jacques's profit is and Kyoko's profit is $ Suppose that Jacques and Kyoko have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Jacques says to himself, "Kyoko and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 50 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." %3D
Transcribed Image Text:3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.00 2.75 50 $137.50 2.50 100 $250.00 2.25 150 $337.50 2.00 200 $400.00 1.75 250 $437.50 1.50 300 $450.00 1.25 350 $437.50 1.00 400 $400.00 0.75 450 $337.50 0.50 500 $250.00 0.25 550 $137.50 600 Suppose Jacques and Kyoko form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jacques and Kyoko agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jacques's profit is and Kyoko's profit is $ Suppose that Jacques and Kyoko have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Jacques says to himself, "Kyoko and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 50 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." %3D
Expert Solution
trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 4 steps with 1 images

SEE SOLUTIONCheck out a sample Q&A here
Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Cartel
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Cou…
Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Cou…
Economics
ISBN:
9781285165875
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305971493
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781337091992
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics
Principles of Microeconomics
Economics
ISBN:
9781305156050
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Economics 2e
Principles of Economics 2e
Economics
ISBN:
9781947172364
Author:
Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:
OpenStax
SEE MORE TEXTBOOKS