3. Two software companies sell competing products. These products are substitutes so that the number of units that either company sells is a decreasing function of its own price and an increasing function of the other product's price. Let P1 and X1 be the price and quantity sold of product 1, and P2 and X2 the price and quantity sold of product 2. We have that X1 = 1,00090-P1+P2) and X2 = 1,000 90-P2+P1). Each company has 4 4 incurred a fixed cost for designing their software and writing programmes, but the cost of selling to an extra user is zero. As the firms compete in prices, each company will choose a price that maximises its profits.

Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)
8th Edition
ISBN:9781337091992
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw
Chapter4: The Market Forces Of Supply And Demand
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 10PA
icon
Related questions
Question
8. Two software companies sell competing products. These products are substitutes so
that the number of units that either company sells is a decreasing function of its own
price and an increasing function of the other product's price. Let P1 and X1 be the price
and quantity sold of product 1, and P2 and X2 the price and quantity sold of product 2. We
have that X1 = 1,000|90--P1+
2
and X2 = 1,000(90-P2+P1). Each company has
incurred a fixed cost for designing their software and writing programmes, but the cost of
selling to an extra user is zero. As the firms compete in prices, each company will choose
a price that maximises its profits.
(a) Explain why the price that maximises each company's profits is the same as the
price that maximises its total revenue.
(b) Write an expression for the total revenue of each company as a function of it its price
and the other company's price.
(c) Company's 1 best response function BR1(P2) is the price of product 1 that
maximises its profits given the price of product 2 is P2. Similarly, company's 2 best
response function BR2(P1) is the price of product 2 that maximises its profits given
the price of product 1. Using these functions, write the best response function of
each company and then calculate the Nash equilibrium prices and the total revenue
of each company. Show diagrammatically the BRs and the Nash equilibrium in prices.
(d) Suppose that company 1 sets its price first. Company 2 knows the price P1 the
company has chosen, and it knows that company 1 will not change its price. Also,
company 1 is aware of how company 2 will react to its own choice of price. Explain
and calculate the prices of the two companies and their total revenues. Comment on
whether there is a first or second mover advantage in this model in terms of the size
of the change in the total revenue of each company relative to its total revenue in the
simultaneous price setting game.
Transcribed Image Text:8. Two software companies sell competing products. These products are substitutes so that the number of units that either company sells is a decreasing function of its own price and an increasing function of the other product's price. Let P1 and X1 be the price and quantity sold of product 1, and P2 and X2 the price and quantity sold of product 2. We have that X1 = 1,000|90--P1+ 2 and X2 = 1,000(90-P2+P1). Each company has incurred a fixed cost for designing their software and writing programmes, but the cost of selling to an extra user is zero. As the firms compete in prices, each company will choose a price that maximises its profits. (a) Explain why the price that maximises each company's profits is the same as the price that maximises its total revenue. (b) Write an expression for the total revenue of each company as a function of it its price and the other company's price. (c) Company's 1 best response function BR1(P2) is the price of product 1 that maximises its profits given the price of product 2 is P2. Similarly, company's 2 best response function BR2(P1) is the price of product 2 that maximises its profits given the price of product 1. Using these functions, write the best response function of each company and then calculate the Nash equilibrium prices and the total revenue of each company. Show diagrammatically the BRs and the Nash equilibrium in prices. (d) Suppose that company 1 sets its price first. Company 2 knows the price P1 the company has chosen, and it knows that company 1 will not change its price. Also, company 1 is aware of how company 2 will react to its own choice of price. Explain and calculate the prices of the two companies and their total revenues. Comment on whether there is a first or second mover advantage in this model in terms of the size of the change in the total revenue of each company relative to its total revenue in the simultaneous price setting game.
Expert Solution
trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 2 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Elasticity of demand
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781337091992
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Economics
ISBN:
9781305506381
Author:
James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Economics:
Economics:
Economics
ISBN:
9781285859460
Author:
BOYES, William
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics
Principles of Microeconomics
Economics
ISBN:
9781305156050
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Economics
ISBN:
9781337517942
Author:
NICHOLSON
Publisher:
Cengage
Exploring Economics
Exploring Economics
Economics
ISBN:
9781544336329
Author:
Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:
SAGE Publications, Inc