Please try to solve in 2 hours 4. North Koreas's leader Kim Jong-un must decide whether to keep or dismantle NorthKorea's nuclear weapons, while China must decide whether or not to provide economicaid to North Korea. The ordinal payoff matrix (with 4 being the highest payoff and 1being the lowest payoff) is shown below.CHINAAidDon't aidDismantle3,41,3NORTH KOREA[Kim Jong-un)Don'tdismantle4,22,1(a) Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game (or explain why no suchequilibrium exists) in the case when North Korea and China move simultaneously.(b) Is it possible for China to achieve its best possible outcome by credibly declaring astrategic move in the pregame?(i) If not, explain clearly why not?(ii) If so, what sort of strategic move would China use? Draw a sequential game treewhere China takes its strategic decision choice in the pregame stage (that is in the firstnode) and North Korea takes its decision next and explain with the help of this figure.How might China phrase its declaration to North Korea?

Given, Two Players : North Korea and ChinaNorth Korea strategies : Dismantle and Don't…

4. North Koreas's leader Kim Jong-un must decide whether to keep or dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, while China must decide whether or not to provide economic aid to North Korea. The ordinal payoff matrix (with 4 being the highest payoff and 1 being the lowest payoff) is shown below.

4. North Koreas's leader Kim Jong-un must decide whether to keep or dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, while China must decide whether or not to provide economic aid to North Korea. The ordinal payoff matrix (with 4 being the highest payoff and 1 being the lowest payoff) is shown below.

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter12: Environmental Protection And Negative Externalities

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 12SCQ: Consider the case of global environmental problems that spill across international borders as a...

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Sadaam Hussein is deciding where to hide his weapons of mass destruction(WMD), while the United Nations is deciding where to look for them. Thepayoff to Hussein from successfully hiding WMD is 5 and from havingthem found is 2. For the UN, the payoff to finding WMD is 9 and from notfinding them is 4. Hussein can hide them in facility X, Y, or Z. The UNinspection team has to decide which facilities to check. Because the inspectors are limited in terms of time and personnel, they cannot check allfacilities.a. Suppose the UN has two pure strategies: It can either inspect facilitiesX and Y (both of which are geographically close to each other) orinspect facility Z. Find a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.b. Suppose the UN can inspect any two facilities, so that it has three purestrategies. The UN can inspect X and Y, X and Z, or Y and Z. Find aNash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
3. Suppose that the various Balls of basketball or internet fame Lavar, Lamelo, Liangelo, Lonzo,and Spalding are considering playing in a 1-on-1 tournament. They get a payoff of 0 if theydecide not to participate. The following table illustrates their payoffs across the variousscenarios. 1 Player 2 Players 3 Players 4 Players 5 Players Lavar 10 4 2 -2 -5 Lamelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Liangelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Lonzo 10 8 7 6 5 Spalding 10 9 8 7 6 a. Find and describe all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.b. Suppose now Spalding, since it is in fact a literal basketball, gets a payoff of 0 in anycircumstance, being an inanimate object. The table is now as follows: 1 Player 2 Players 3 Players 4Players 5 Players Lavar 10 4 2 -2 -5 Lamelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Liangelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Lonzo 10 8 7 6 5 Spalding 0 0 0 0 0 Find and describe all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.
53. The Indiana University basketball team trails by twopoints with eight seconds to go and has the ball. Shouldit attempt a two-point shot or a three-point shot?Assume that the Indiana shot will end the game and thatno foul will occur on the shot. Assume that a three-pointshot has a 30% chance of success, and atwo-point shot has a 55% chance of success. Finally,assume that Indiana has a 55% chance of winning inovertime.
The following table describes the productionpossibilities of two cities in the country of Baseballia:Pairs of RedSocks per Workerper HourPairs of WhiteSocks per Workerper HourBoston 3 3Chicago 2 1a. Without trade, what is the price of white socks (interms of red socks) in Boston? What is the price inChicago?b. Which city has an absolute advantage in theproduction of each color sock? Which city has acomparative advantage in the production of eachcolor sock?c. If the cities trade with each other, which color sockwill each export?d. What is the range of prices at which mutuallybeneficial trade can occur?
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In the tradeoff between economic output and environmental protection, what do the combinations on the protection possibility curve represent?
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H2. One day, Sam and Ryan play odds/evens to see who gets the last doughnut. On command, they each extend one or two fingers. If the sum is odd Sam wins the doughnut, if the sum is even Ryan wins the doughnut. Suppose the payoff from winning the doughnut is 1 and the payoff from losing is 0. a) Illustrate this interaction as a game in matrix form. b) Suppose that Sam thinks that Ryan will play one finger for sure? What will Sam play? Does Sam have reason to think that Ryan will play one finger for sure? c) Do either of them have a strictly dominated strategy? d) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game, if any. e) Suppose that Sam thinks that Ryan will play one finger or two fingers with even odds. Will Ryan play one finger for sure, play two fingers for sure or play each strategy with even odds? Does Sam have good reason to believe that Ryan will play one finger or two fingers with even odds?
Imagine that two firms in two different countries want to bring a new product tomarket. Due to economies of scale, if both firms do this, they will both lose £50million. But if only one firm does this, it will gain £300 million.(a) What is the best strategy for firm A, if firm B has not yet entered the market, andwhy?(b) Illustrate this with a game theory diagram, showing appropriate payouts.(c) What is the welfare-maximising strategy for a government, and why?