I want to get an answer to my question. It is my 5th question which you wrote me that our tutors can't answer my question. I don't know why but it is my Economics question. and u (x,x2) = x'*x}² . Their5. The traders' utilities are the following u'(x, x2 ) = x*x2/31/31/2initial endowments are a' = (10,10) and a? = (20,5). Traders come to a market and||exchange commodities to maximize their utilities. Compute the price vector in equilibrium.Compare the utilities before and after the exchange.

The utility function of trader1 u1(x1,x2)= x1^2/3 . x2^1/3 and initial endowment (10,10) The…

5. The traders' utilities are the following u'(x,,x,)= x}*x and u (x,,x,) = x"*x}². Their 2/31/3 1/31/2 initial endowments are a' = (10,10) and a² = (20,5). Traders come to a market and exchange commodities to maximize their utilities. Compute the price vector in equilibrium. Compare the utilities before and after the exchange.

5. The traders' utilities are the following u'(x,,x,)= x}x and u (x,,x,) = x"x}². Their 2/31/3 1/31/2 initial endowments are a' = (10,10) and a² = (20,5). Traders come to a market and exchange commodities to maximize their utilities. Compute the price vector in equilibrium. Compare the utilities before and after the exchange.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter13: General Equilibrium And Welfare

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13.5P

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