8. The Borda Count is a common way of making a choice among more than two alter- natives. As defined in the text, each member of society assigns a rank to the social alternatives (1,2,...), with 1 corresponding to first choice, and so on. The ranks each alternative gets are summed over all the individuals. The alternative with the low est sum wins; the second choice has the second-lowest sum, and so forth. Set up an example to show that the Borda Count violates the independence of irrelevant alter natives. Hint: Use a three-person society with three alternatives and rank them using

8. The Borda Count is a common way of making a choice among more than two alter- natives. As defined in the text, each member of society assigns a rank to the social alternatives (1,2,...), with 1 corresponding to first choice, and so on. The ranks each alternative gets are summed over all the individuals. The alternative with the low est sum wins; the second choice has the second-lowest sum, and so forth. Set up an example to show that the Borda Count violates the independence of irrelevant alter natives. Hint: Use a three-person society with three alternatives and rank them using

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7PA

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