Adverse selection is the phenomenon where it is not possible to have a Pareto improvement, no matter how the government selects the initial distribution of Income B charging a higher insurance premium to cover the costs of risk actually leads to the situation in which only the most risky buy the insurance, and this causes that market to fail. people select the wrong indifference curve. information is withheld from the government so it cannot make the necessary selection of the correct amount of public good to produce

Adverse selection is the phenomenon where it is not possible to have a Pareto improvement, no matter how the government selects the initial distribution of Income B charging a higher insurance premium to cover the costs of risk actually leads to the situation in which only the most risky buy the insurance, and this causes that market to fail. people select the wrong indifference curve. information is withheld from the government so it cannot make the necessary selection of the correct amount of public good to produce

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter12: Medicare

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4QAP

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Multiple Choice Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss. Adverse selection occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured. This can happen, for example, when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. The relationship between smoking status and mortality provides a good illustration for adverse selection, especially in the case in which a life insurance company did not vary its premiums according to smoking status of its customers. To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers may offer premiums that are proportional to a customer's risk.
Suppose a consumer has S100 today and he tells you he is willing to wait X amount of time for another $50. The same consumer also tells you that in the future if he has $10 he ts willng to wait Y amount of time for another $50.If Y is greater than X, does the individual exhibit hyperbolic discounting, exponential discounting, or is there not enough information to determine? Briely explain your answer.
Do you think Canada's universal health care program can alleviate problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection in the private insurance markets? Why or why not? John's utility curve over total wealth is given by U(W) =VW (i.e. square root of W). Suppose that he has a 50% chance of being healthy. If he is healthy, he gets all his wealth-$10,000. If he becomes sick, he only has $3,600 remaining after medical expenditures. Calculate John's wealth and utility when he does and does not get sick, his expected utility, expected wealth, and his expected loss. Now he has the option of buying health insurance Calculate the maximum amount John would be willing to pay to fully insure against the cost of the sickness. How much is the actuarially fair and risk premium? Suppose that society consists of large, equal numbers of identical male and identical female consumers. Male consumers are similar to John; female consumers differ only in that they face a 25% probability of being sick, but…
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Suppose the probability that Recall Scarlett is sued is .1 and her income is 1000. In the case, she is sued she will lose all of her income in the settlement. She may purchase malpractice insurance at a rate of $r per $1 of coverage. Finally assume that her utility of income is U($) = ($)^1/2. What is Scarlett’s demand curve for insurance (that is find her demand for insurance for all r ≥ .1)?
ASAP Consider an individual for whom utility is U = ln(I) There are two states of the world (G,B): Outcome G = 2000 with probability .4 Outcome B = 1000 with probability .6 W1 = 2000 L = 1000 π = .6 Option = invest $50 to lower π to .2 An insurance company is willing to offer a contract in which the individual pays a premium and gets full compensation for the loss (1000) in the bad state. a) With no insurance but the option of investing the $50, what is the utility of the individual? b) What is the first-best outcome for utility of the individual, insurance premium, and profits of the insurance company?