Below is the demand schedule for wholesale pallets of ice cream. Assume that the marginal cost of supplying a wholesale pallet of ice cream is a flat $40 per pallet. Price Quantity Total Revenue Total Cost Profit $100 40 $90 50 $80 60 $70 70 $60 80 $50 90 $40 100 First, complete the table above for TR, TC, and profit. If this were a competitive industry, where P=MC, what would be the price and quantity of wholesale ice cream? If ice cream were supplied instead by a profit-maximizing monopoly, what would be the price and quantity? If Ben and Jerry were to form a collusive duopoly for the production of ice cream, what would be the price and industry quantity? If Ben and Jerry split the market in d. evenly, what would be the output and profit for each of them? What if Ben were to cheat on the cartel and produce a higher output by 10 pallets: What is Ben’s resulting output and profit? And Jerry’s, assuming he stays at the lower output? (Remember that the market price for all units sold is determined by the total output quantity.) But Jerry is a bright guy and has the same incentive to cheat as Ben. If Jerry makes the same move, to produce the 10-pallet-higher output, what is the resulting output and profit result for both of them? Create a payoff matrix from e., f., and g. using the profit results from one or the other or both producing the low (Q=25) and high (Q=35) outputs. What is the Nash Equilibrium, using the underlining method we reviewed in class? Is this a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation? Why or why not? Hi, I need help with as many as these as I can get help with. Starting with B

Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)

16th Edition

ISBN:9781305506893

Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Publisher:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Chapter11: Price-searcher Markets With High Entry Barriers

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 14CQ

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Below is the demand schedule for wholesale pallets of ice cream. Assume that the marginal cost of supplying a wholesale pallet of ice cream is a flat $40 per pallet.

Price	Quantity	Total Revenue	Total Cost	Profit
$100	40
$90	50
$80	60
$70	70
$60	80
$50	90
$40	100

First, complete the table above for TR, TC, and profit.
If this were a competitive industry, where P=MC, what would be the price and quantity of wholesale ice cream?
If ice cream were supplied instead by a profit-maximizing monopoly, what would be the price and quantity?
If Ben and Jerry were to form a collusive duopoly for the production of ice cream, what would be the price and industry quantity?
If Ben and Jerry split the market in d. evenly, what would be the output and profit for each of them?
What if Ben were to cheat on the cartel and produce a higher output by 10 pallets: What is Ben’s resulting output and profit? And Jerry’s, assuming he stays at the lower output? (Remember that the market price for all units sold is determined by the total output quantity.)
But Jerry is a bright guy and has the same incentive to cheat as Ben. If Jerry makes the same move, to produce the 10-pallet-higher output, what is the resulting output and profit result for both of them?
Create a payoff matrix from e., f., and g. using the profit results from one or the other or both producing the low (Q=25) and high (Q=35) outputs.
What is the Nash Equilibrium, using the underlining method we reviewed in class? Is this a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation? Why or why not?

Hi, I need help with as many as these as I can get help with. Starting with B

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