Blue Origin must decide about entering the space travel market but ignores if SpaceX, the monopolist in the sector, is efficient or not. If SpaceX is efficient, it has zero marginal costs and gains 18.8 in a monopoly and 6.3 in a duopoly. If it is inefficient, its marginal costs increase to 5 and gains are 8.3 in a monopoly and 4 in a duopoly. Should Blue Origin enters the market, it would gain 27 if SpaceX is inefficient and lose 3.8 otherwise. The demand function is p = 15 - 3*q. To signal its nature in the first period, SpaceX should produce

Blue Origin must decide about entering the space travel market but ignores if SpaceX, the monopolist in the sector, is efficient or not. If SpaceX is efficient, it has zero marginal costs and gains 18.8 in a monopoly and 6.3 in a duopoly. If it is inefficient, its marginal costs increase to 5 and gains are 8.3 in a monopoly and 4 in a duopoly. Should Blue Origin enters the market, it would gain 27 if SpaceX is inefficient and lose 3.8 otherwise. The demand function is p = 15 - 3*q. To signal its nature in the first period, SpaceX should produce

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7P

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What stops oligopolists from acting together as a monopolist and earning the highest possible level of profits?
Y5 The new food delivery company DoorDash is thinking of entering New Zealand. Its rivalry is the existing UBER Eats. Both these companies simultaneously choose whether to operate in January, February, March, or April, or not to operate at all. Thus the strategy set for both these companies is {January, February, March, April, or Not to Operate}. Assume that the profit received by a monopolist in month m (where a monopoly means only one company is operating) is 10 x m – 15, whereas each duopolist (so both are operating) would earn 4 x m – 15. A company makes zero profit for any month that is not operating. Also, the value of m while calculating the profits for a particular month in the above equations is as follows {January = 1, February = 2, March = 3, April = 4}. The payoffs of the strategic form of this game are the sum of the profit of all the months. For example, if DoorDash operates in February and UBER Eats in March, then DoorDash earns zero profit in January; 5 (=10 x 2 - 15)…
Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the reaction curve of oligopolists? b) What will be the production of each of the companies? c) What is the selling price practiced by oligopolists? d) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? e) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will…
The Competition Bureau in Canada wants to increase competition and reduce monopoly power. Thus it it worries about industry concentration in Canada. Let's assume that the Canadian halibut processing industry there are only two firms(duopoly). Under such a market structure, if one of the halibut processing firm increases its price, then the other firm in the halibut processing industry can: keep the price of its processed halibut constant and thus increase its market share. keep its price of its processed halibut constant and thus decrease its market share. decrease its price of its processed halibut and thus decrease its market share. try to achieve economies of scale. increase its price of its processed halibut and thus increase its market share.
3. Based on the best available econometric estimates, the market elasticity of demandfor your firm’s product is -2. The marginal cost of producing your product is constant at $50. a. What is your optimal per unit price if you are a monopolist?b. What is your optimal per unit price if you compete against one other firm in a Cournotoligopoly? What is your optimal per unit price if you compete against 20 other firms in aCournot oligopoly?c. What price pattern are you seeing between parts a and b? Explain why this makes intuitivesense (hint: at what price will you eventually sell your product if the number of firmscontinues to increase?).d. Suppose once again you are a monopolist, but your product sells to two different groups ofconsumers segmented by region. The east coast customers have demand elasticity equal towhat is shown above (-2) and your west coast customers have demand elasticity equal to -4.Determine the optimal prices under third-degree price discrimination. What conditions…
Consider a duopolistic market with an inverse demand curve P(Q) = 460 − 4Qand constant marginal costs for each firm that are given by MC(Q) = 10.Assume fixed costs are negligible. The two identical firms are competing in this market by choosing their production quantities simultaneously. In the equilibrium, each firm produces 37.5 units and the prevailing market price is 160. How would the joint profits of these two firms change if they successfully formed a cartel? Change in joint profits: ? (Enter your answer rounded to two decimal places; include a negative sign if appropriate.)
Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? b) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will remain very close to what they are today and its profits will not increase"
Suppose three Cournot competitors, each with costs Ci = 30qi, face an inverse market demand curve of P = 480 – 4Q. Suppose merging will not change costs. a. Find profits for the three firms. Note: Don’t round your answers. How will the profits change for F1 and for F2|3 if F2 and F3 merge? b. Suppose that after the merger occurs, F1 and the new firm F2|3 successfully collude at setting the monopoly price and output, and splitting the resulting monopoly profits. How, if at all, does this change the impact of the merger on F1 and on the merged firm?
Suppose that a hospital monopolizes the local market for heart surgery, charging $10,000 per procedure. The hospital does 1000 heart surgeries annually, and the cost of heart surgery is $5000 per procedure. The hospital is a duopolist in the market for cataract surgery. The hospital and its competitor both perform 2,000 cataract procedures annually, charge $2000 per procedure, and have costs of $1,000 per procedure. The hospital plans to go to insurers and offer a bundled price. It will discount the price of heart surgery below $10,000 and hold the price of cataracts at $2,000, provided that it is given exclusivity in the cataract market. What price for heart surgery must the hospital charge to insure that its competitor cannot profitably compete in the cataract market? (Assume that the hospital would match its rival’s price in the cataract market if the rival were to respond to this bundling arrangement by cutting its cataract price).
Please help with these 3 T/F: just the answer is needed - true or false 1. Consider a duopoly model in which two firms have the same cost functions. Comparing a Stackelber model and a Cournot model, a Stackelberg leader will necessarily make at least as much profit as he would if he acted as a Cournot duopolist. 2. In the Bertrand model, each firm decides its quantity simultaneously, and the price will be determined by the market demand with the total quantities supplied. 3. A duopoly in which two identical firms are engaged in Bertrand competition will not distort prices from their competitive levels.
In a market with a Duopoly, if Market Demand is P=300-Q find the Cournot reaction curves and the Cournot Quantity solutions then deduce the Price in the case where Marginal Costs curves for either of the Duopoly firms is MC1=q1+30 and MC2=q2+30. Compare your results to the case where a Monopolist that has a MC=Q+30 replaces the Duopoly. What are the Monopoly Quantity and Price? Which quantities are bigger, Cournot or Monopoly? What is the Consumer Surplus in both cases? Set-up the Oligopoly model in a game theoretical prisoner’s dilemma framework. Explain briefly the strategies and how you reach the Nash Equilibrium.
True or False: (D). A monopoly earns total revenue of $5000 when it sells 500 units of output and total revenue of $5400 when it sells 600 units of output. Thus, the marginal revenue of the 600th unit is $9. (E). We call a market where there is only one buyer for a good or service a monopoly. (F). There are a few firms selling differentiated products in a monopolistically competitive industry. (G). When a demand curve is a downward sloping straight line, the slope of the marginal revenue curve is twice as steep as the demand curve.