Classify cach statement as either true or false. A tournament compensation scheme is subject to ability risk. Josephina receives the largest bonus because she had the highest sales last month. Jana had the second highest sales and receives the second largest bonus. This is an example of a tournament compensation scheme. Professors who grade on a curve are using a tournament compensation scheme. Answer Bank true false 000

Classify cach statement as either true or false. A tournament compensation scheme is subject to ability risk. Josephina receives the largest bonus because she had the highest sales last month. Jana had the second highest sales and receives the second largest bonus. This is an example of a tournament compensation scheme. Professors who grade on a curve are using a tournament compensation scheme. Answer Bank true false 000

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.11P

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Following are the results of a study that used a case–control design. This study evaluated factors associated with admission to college. A total of 650 students were admitted to college (cases), and they were compared to 650 students who were not admitted to college (controls). The purpose of this study was to identify factors that are associated with the likelihood of being accepted into college. (8 questions) Results of a Hypothetical Study of Factors Related to Admission to College Factor Odds Ratio Female gender 1.4 Alcohol consumption 0.5 Sedentary life 1.0 Smoking 0.4 Illicit drug use 0.2 Regular sports practice 2.1 True or False regarding this case–control study. Being female was…
Question 18 Job-specific human capital In this problem, based on a simplified version of the model in Bhattacharya and Sood (2006), we will explore how linking employment and health insurance provision can (partially) solve the adverse selection problem if the labor market is competitive. Suppose that there are two types of workers – sickly workers with probability ps of falling ill over the course of the next year, and robust workers with probability pr < ps of falling ill. Employers cannot observe whether a worker is sickly or robust, and because of US law they can only decide to offer health insurance to all of their workers, or none at all. We will assume that a just-hired employee is less productive than an employee who has more experience; let MPn be the marginal value product of new employees, and MPe > MPn be the marginal value product of experienced employees. In this simple model, marginal value product depends only on experience, not on whether a worker is sickly or…