Consider a a two state model. Suppose that there are two consumers, A and B, with endowments of wA = (4, 6) and wB = (6,8). Let the objective probability of state 1 occuring be T. Suppose that both consumers are expected utility maximizers and strictly risk averse and that they have identical preferences TU(C1)+ (1 – 7)u(c2) with u'(-) > 0, and u"(·) < 0. | 1. Is there ideosyncratic risk? Is there aggregate risk? Demonstrate/explain. 2. I claim that neither consumer will be fully insured in the Walrasian equilibrium of this economy. Prove this claim. 3. What (if anything) can we say about the Walrasian Equilibrium price ratio in this economy?
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- Suppose that Winnie the Pooh and Eeyore have the same value function: v(x) = x1/2 for gains and v(x) = -2(|x|)1/2 for losses. The two are also facing the same choice, between (S) $1 for sure and (G) a gamble with a 25% chance of winning $4 and a 75% chance of winning nothing. Winnie the Pooh and Eeyore both subjectively weight probabilities correctly. Winnie the Pooh codes all outcomes as gains; that is, he takes as his reference point winning nothing. For Pooh: What is the value of S? What is the value of G? Which would he choose? Eeyore codes all outcomes as losses; that is, he takes as his reference point winning $4. For Eeyore: What is the value of S? What is the value of G? Which would he choose?Let U(x)= x^(beta/2) denote an agent's utility function, where Beta > 0 is a parameter that defines the agent's attitude towards risk. Consider a gamble that pays a prize X = 10 with probability 0.2, a price X = 50 with probability 0.4 and a price X = 100 with probability 0.4. Compute the agentís expected utility for such gamble and find the value of Beta such that the agentis risk neutral? Suppose B= 1, what is the certainty equivalent of the gamble described above? What is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion?True/False a. Consider a strategic game, in which player i has two actions, a and b. Let s−i be some strategy profile of her opponents. If a IS a best response to s−i, then b is NOT a best response to s−i. b. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS NOT a best response to s−i, then a does NOT weakly dominates b. c. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, IS a best response to s−i, SO IS a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. d. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, is NOT a best response to some strategy profile of her opponents, s−i, NEITHER is a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. e. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS a best response to s−i, SO IS any mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a. f. Consider the same game in (a). If a…
- Y5 Alfred is a risk-averse person with $100 in monetary wealth and owns a house worth $300, for total wealth of $400. The probability that his house is destroyed by fire (equivalent to a loss of $300) is pne = 0.5. If he exerts an effort level e = 0.3 to keep his house safe, the probability falls to pe = 0.2. His utility function is: U = w0.5 – e where e is effort level exerted (zero in the case of no effort and 0.3 in the case of effort).a. In the absence of insurance, does Alfred exert effort to lower the probability of fire?HINT: Calculate and compare the expected utility i) with effort, and ii) without effort. If effort is exerted, then the effort cost is paid regardless of whether or not a fire occurs.b. Alfred is considering buying fire insurance. The insurance agent explains that a home owner’s insurance policy would require paying a premium α and would repay the value of the house in the event of fire, minus a deductible “D”. [A deductible is an amount of money that the…The mixed stratergy nash equalibrium consists of : the probability of firm A selecting October is 0.692 and probability of firm A selecting December is 0.309. The probability of firm B selecting October is 0.5 and probability of firm selecting December is 0.5. In the equilibrium you calculated above, what is the probability that both consoles are released in October? In December? What are the expected payoffs of firm A and of firm B in equilibrium?A driver's wealth $100,000 includes a car of $20,000. To install a car alarm costs the driver $1,750. The probability that the car is stolen is 0.2 when the car does not have an alarm and 0.1 when the car does have an alarm. Assume the driver's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is U(W) = ln(W). Suppose the driver is deciding between the following three options: (a) purchase no car insurance, do not install car alarm; (b) purchase fair insurance to replace the car, do not install car alarm; and (c) purchase no car insurance, install car alarm. Of these three options, the driver prefers: A. option (a). B. option (b). C. option (c). D. options (a) and (b). E. options (a) and (c). F. options (b) and (c). G. all options equally. H. none of these options.
- Consider a medieval Italian merchant who is a risk averse expected utility maximiser. Their wealth will beequal to y if their ship returns safely from Asia loaded with the finest silk. If the ship sinks, their incomewill be y − L. The chance of a safe return is 50%. Now suppose that there are two identical merchants, A and B, who are both risk averse expected utilitymaximisers with utility of income given by u(y) = ln y. The income of each merchant will be 8 if theirown ship returns and 2 if it sinks. As previously, the probability of a safe return is 50% for each ship.However, with probability p ≤ 1/2 both ships will return safely. With the same probability p both willsink. Finally, with the remaining probability, only one ship will return safely.(iv) Compute the increase in the utility of each merchant that they could achieve from pooling theirincomes (as a function of p). How does the benefit of pooling depend on the probability p? Explainintuitively why this is the case.Arielle is a risk-averse traveler who is planning a trip to Canada. She is planning on carrying $400 in her backpack. Walking the streets of Canada, however, can be dangerous and there is some chance that she will have her backpack stolen. If she is only carrying cash and her backpack is stolen, she will have no money ($0). The probability that her backpack is stolen is 1/5. Finally assume that her preferences over money can be represented by the utility function U(x)=(x)^0.5 Suppose that she has the option to buy traveler’s checks. If her backpack is stolen and she is carrying traveler’s checks then she can have those checks replaced at no cost. National Express charges a fee of $p per $1 traveler’s check. In other words, the price of a $1 traveler’s check is $(1+p). If the purchase of traveler’s checks is a fair bet, then we know that the purchase of traveler checks will not change her expected income. Show that if the purchase is a fair bet, then the price (1+p) = $1.25.An investor with capital x can invest any amount between0 and x; if y is invested then y is eitherwon or lost, with respectiveprobabilities p and 1− p. If p > 1/2, how much should be invested byan investor having a exponential utility function u(x) = 1 − e −bx ,b > 0.
- An agent makes decisions using U(ct) = (ct−χct−1)1−γ 1−γ . Answer the following: (a) Suppose χ = 0. Derive an expression for the coefficient of relative risk aversion RR(ct)? (b) Suppose 0 < χ ≤ 1. Derive an expression for the coefficient of relative risk aversion RR(ct)?A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the occurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wagers W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and if it does not. Assume that the Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = with r > 0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA? Alex plays football for a local club in Kumasi. If he does not suffer any injury by the end of the season, he will get a professional contract with Kotoko, which is worth $10,000. If he is injured though, he will get a contract as a fitness coach worth $100. The probability of the injury is 10%. Describe the lottery What is the expected value of this lottery? What is the expected utility of this lottery if u(x) = Assume he could buy insurance at price P that could pay $9,900 in case of injury. What is the highest value of P that makes it worthwhile for Alex to purchase insurance? What is the certainty…Each of the two players independently (and simultaneously with the other) decides whether to go to a play or a concert. Each would rather go with the other to a concert than with them to a play, but prefers this to not being together, in which case they don't care where they go alone. Additionally, each is indifferent between attending the play together and participating in a lottery where both go to the concert with a probability of ¾ and to different events with a probability of ¼. Describe the game in matrix form and find all its equilibria under the assumption that the players have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences.