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Consider the game in the image attached, which is infinitely repeated at t = 1, 2, ... Both players discount the future at rate: delta E(0, 1). The stage game is in the image attached.
Suppose that the players play (C,C) in period t = 1, 3, 5, ... and plays (D,D) in period t = 2, 4, 6,... Compute the discounted payoff of each player.
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- Consider a medieval Italian merchant who is a risk averse expected utility maximiser. Their wealth will beequal to y if their ship returns safely from Asia loaded with the finest silk. If the ship sinks, their incomewill be y − L. The chance of a safe return is 50%. Now suppose that there are two identical merchants, A and B, who are both risk averse expected utilitymaximisers with utility of income given by u(y) = ln y. The income of each merchant will be 8 if theirown ship returns and 2 if it sinks. As previously, the probability of a safe return is 50% for each ship.However, with probability p ≤ 1/2 both ships will return safely. With the same probability p both willsink. Finally, with the remaining probability, only one ship will return safely.(iv) Compute the increase in the utility of each merchant that they could achieve from pooling theirincomes (as a function of p). How does the benefit of pooling depend on the probability p? Explainintuitively why this is the case.Q56 A Nash equilibrium is an outcome... a. Achieved by cooperation between players in the game. b. That is achieved by collusion where no party has an incentive to change their behaviour. c. Where each player's strategy depends on the behaviour of its opponents. d. That is achieved when players in the game have jointly maximized profits and divided those profits according to market share of each player. e. Where each player's best strategy is to maintain its present behaviour given the present behaviour of the other players.The mixed stratergy nash equalibrium consists of : the probability of firm A selecting October is 0.692 and probability of firm A selecting December is 0.309. The probability of firm B selecting October is 0.5 and probability of firm selecting December is 0.5. In the equilibrium you calculated above, what is the probability that both consoles are released in October? In December? What are the expected payoffs of firm A and of firm B in equilibrium?
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- The preferences of agents A and B are representable by expected utility functions such that uA(x) = 5x^1/3 +30, and uB(x)= 1/5x - 20. Then, the following allocation of the expected returns of a risky joint investment of A and B as represented by lottery L = ((2/3);1500), (1/3);120)) is Pareto efficient: (a) xA = (500,100), xB = (1000,20) (b) xA = (100,100), xB= (1300,20) (c) xA= (80,80), xB = (1420,40) (d) xA = (750,60), xB= (750,60) (e) NOPACQUESTION 16 Selwyn has a utility function of the form uW=(W^(1-x))/(1-x), where x=0.7. Calculate Selwyn's coefficient of relative risk aversion when his wealth is equal to £100.Consider the game of Chicken in which each player has the option to “get out of the way” and “hang tough” with payoffs: Get out of the way Hang tough Get out of the way 2,2 1,3 Hang tough 3,1 00 a. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if they exist b. Let k be the probability that player 1 chooses “hang tough” and u be the probability that player two chooses “hang tough.” Find the mixed stragety Nash equilibria, if they exist
- An investor with capital x can invest any amount between0 and x; if y is invested then y is eitherwon or lost, with respectiveprobabilities p and 1− p. If p > 1/2, how much should be invested byan investor having a exponential utility function u(x) = 1 − e −bx ,b > 0.Consider two bidders – Alice and Bob who are bidding for a second-hand car. Each of them knows the private value she/he assigns to the car, but does not know the exact value of others. It is common knowledge that the value of other bidders is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and $10000. Assume that Alice values the car at $8500 and Bob values the car at $4500. a) If Alice and Bob participated in the second-price sealed bid auction, what would they bid and what would be the result of the auction? Explain your answer. b) If they participate instead in a first-price sealed bid auction, what would they bid and what would be the result of the auction? Explain your answer. c) Calculate and compare the revenue of the seller in the above situations. Which type of auction should the seller use? Explain your answerSuppose Investor A has a power utility function with γ = 1, whilst Investor B has a power utility function with γ = 0.5 (i) Which investor is more risk-averse(assuming that w > 0)? (ii) Suppose that Investor B has an initial wealth of 100 and is offered the opportunity to buy Investment X for 100, which offers an equal chance of a payout of 110 or 92. Will she choose to buy Investment X?