Consider a market with only two producers, each with constant marginal cost: MC1 = 20, MC2 = 50. Market demand is Q = 400 – P. (Ignore fixed costs at the beginning.) A. Basic cases a. If the two firms compete as Cournot oligopolists, find their reaction functions and solve for the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price. b. Suppose Firm 1 tries to acquire Firm 2, arguing that the joint venture will be able to streamline certain processes and lower costs. A top management consulting firm has even produced a report which shows that marginal cost will indeed be lowered to only MC = 10. Assuming this is accurate, do you think government regulators should allow the merger to proceed? Explain your reasoning.
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- Try the analysis with an n-firm Cournot oligopoly in which one firm innovates to reduce cost from c to c/2. For this problem, assume n = 2, and use the demand and cost numbers used in the lecture. That is, let inverse market demand be given by P = 100 - Q, and let marginal cost be constant at 50 per unit before the innovation, and 25 per unit after the innovation. (a) Compute what the duopolist stands to gain from innovating. How does it compare to the perfectly competitive firm and to the monopolist? (b) What can you conclude about the relationship between concentration and innovationConsider a Cournot Oligopoly. One firm has costs C1(Q1) = 12Q1 while the other firm’s cost function is C2(Q2) = 10Q2. The demand for both firms’ products Q=Q1 +Q2 isQD(P)=200−2P. (a) Determine the equilibrium price P, the market shares s1, s2, and the quantities Q1, Q2 produced by both firms. (b) Suppose more firms with the lower cost technology, i.e., with cost function Ci(Qi) = 10Qi enter the market. How many firms with this technology must be in the market such that firm 1’s profit becomes negative. In other words, suppose there is one firm with the high costs, and n firms with the low costs. At what level n will profits of the high-cost firm be negative?Cournot’s Model of Duopoly) Joe and Rebecca are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolists. The market demand function is Qd=5500-25P, where P is the price of a cubic metre of concrete and Qd is the number of cubic metres demanded every year. The marginal cost is $40 per cubic metre. Competition in this market is described by the Cournot model. (a)Given Rebecca’s output is 2000, what is Joe’s residual demand function? What is Joe's output so he maximizes his profit? (b)If Rebecca’s output is qR, what is Joe’s best response function? (c)If Joe’s output is qj, what is Rebecca’s best response function? (d)Plot both Joe and Rebecca’s best response functions on one graph, where the the horizontal axis represents Rebecca’s output qR and the vertical axis represents Joe's output qR. (e)What is the meaning of the interception of the two best response functions?
- There are two firms A and B. Firms compete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities qA and qB. Inverse demand isP(qA +qB) = 18−qA −qB and costs are C(q) = 3∗q for both firms. Firm B is a domestic firm (in Karhide,) and firm A is a foreign firm (from Orgoreyn.) The government of Karhide engages in a strategic trade intervention by giving firm B a per unit subsidy of s. (That is, when firm B produces and sells qB units, firm B receives a payment of s ∗ qB from the government.) We begin by examining the model with an unspecified s ≥ 0. A)Find profit functions for both firms. B)Use first order conditions to find each firm’s best response function.There are two firms A and B. Firms compete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities qA and qB. Inverse demand is P(qA + qB) = 18 − qA − qB and costs are C(q) = 3 ∗ q for both firms. Firm B is a domestic firm (in Karhide,) and firm A is a foreign firm (from Orgoreyn.) The government of Karhide engages in a strategic trade intervention by giving firm B a per unit subsidy of s. (That is, when firm B produces and sells qB units, firm B receives a payment of s ∗ qB from the government.) (d) Solve for the equilibrium outputs (q∗A, q∗b).(e) Solve for the equilibrium price.(f) Solve for firm B profits.H7. For q1=120-2p1-p2 and q2=120-2p2+p1, show that the duopolists have incentives to collude as well as find the -joint profit-maximizing price, output and profit and find each firm’s price, output and profit. What is the optimal defection of each firm, is collusion Nash equilibrium? Show in 2x2 matrix. Is it a prisoner’s dilemma?
- The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. (a) At the initial equilibrium, what is total surplus (consumer surplus plus producer surplus)? Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price? (c) The output? (d) Total profit? (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a…The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price?The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a monopoly?
- The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (c) The output? (d) Total profit?Consider two firms, i = 1; 2, producing differentiated products and engaged in Cournot a. Given the market demands, what are the best-response functions of the two firms? b. Draw the best-response functions both for complements (d 0). c. Compute the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices in this market. d. Compare the outcome between substitutes and complements goods. e. What are the profit-maximizing quantities and prices if firm i is a monopolist in this market? Compare with part c.Consider a quantity-setting duopoly. The two firms are Alpha, Ltd. and Beta, Inc. The demand schedulein this market is: p Qd180 150155 175130 200Each firm has a constant marginal cost of 30 per unit. Suppose each firm can choose to produce either 75units or 100 units. Firms make their quantity choices simultaneously and the market price is whatever itneeds to be to sell the total output in the market.(a) Draw up the normal form game matrix, showing the players, strategies, and payoffs. Show your workdetermining the profits in each box in the matrix.(b) Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game.(c) Suppose the firms were able to come to an agreement to make more profit. What would this agreementbe?(d) Explain how the government might respond to such an agreement and why.