Price agreement Break the agreement Perlis Price agreement (3,2) A (-1,3) B Break the (4,-1) C (0,0) agreement Figure 12 Payoff matrix for two firms in oligopoly Two firms, Perlis and Dizz, produce washing powder in a market characterised by oligopoly. Illegally, the firms have agreed to collude so that they charge broadly the same price for their product. Each firm could increase its own share of the market and profit by breaking the agreement, but if they both do this they would both be worse off. This situation may be characterised as a game and Figure 12 shows the payoff matrix for this game. Figure 12 also labels each cell in the payoff matrix with a letter, A, B, C or D. Based on the information in the payoff matrix, decide which cells, if any, correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Select one answer. Select one: O A There is no Nash equilibrium O A and D O D
Price agreement Break the agreement Perlis Price agreement (3,2) A (-1,3) B Break the (4,-1) C (0,0) agreement Figure 12 Payoff matrix for two firms in oligopoly Two firms, Perlis and Dizz, produce washing powder in a market characterised by oligopoly. Illegally, the firms have agreed to collude so that they charge broadly the same price for their product. Each firm could increase its own share of the market and profit by breaking the agreement, but if they both do this they would both be worse off. This situation may be characterised as a game and Figure 12 shows the payoff matrix for this game. Figure 12 also labels each cell in the payoff matrix with a letter, A, B, C or D. Based on the information in the payoff matrix, decide which cells, if any, correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Select one answer. Select one: O A There is no Nash equilibrium O A and D O D
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Chapter12: Price And Output Determination: Oligopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1E
Related questions
Question
100%
Q17
Expert Solution
This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
Step by step
Solved in 2 steps
Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Economics
ISBN:
9781305506381
Author:
James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305971493
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Economics
ISBN:
9781305506381
Author:
James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305971493
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics
Economics
ISBN:
9781305156050
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Economics 2e
Economics
ISBN:
9781947172364
Author:
Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:
OpenStax