Consider a public good, G, that is shared by Consumer A and B. Each can purchase G at the price of $20 per unit. A's marginal benefit from this public good is given by MBA-50-G. If A thinks B is getting 10 units of G, then A's optimal contribution into G will be units. On the other hand, if A thinks B is getting 20 units of G, then A's optimal contribution into G will be units. Blank # 1 Blank # 2 A/ A/

Consider a public good, G, that is shared by Consumer A and B. Each can purchase G at the price of $20 per unit. A's marginal benefit from this public good is given by MBA-50-G. If A thinks B is getting 10 units of G, then A's optimal contribution into G will be units. On the other hand, if A thinks B is getting 20 units of G, then A's optimal contribution into G will be units. Blank # 1 Blank # 2 A/ A/

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter13: Positive Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 24P: Assume that the marginal private costs of a film producing fuel-efficient can; is greater than the...

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Assume that the marginal private costs of a film producing fuel-efficient can; is greater than the marginal social costs. Assume that the marginal private benefits of a firm producing fuel efficient cars are the same as the marginal social benefits. Discuss one wags.r that the government cans ï¬‚y to increase production and sales of fuel efficient cars to the socially desirable amount. Hint: the government is flying to affect production through costs, net benefits.
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