Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 1,200 − 3Q1 − 3Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 6. Based on this information, the Stackelberg follower's reaction function is Multiple Choice: Q2 = 398 − 0.5Q2. Q2 = 199 − 0.5Q1. Q2 = 398 − 0.5Q1. Q2 = 199 − 0.5Q2.

Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 1,200 − 3Q1 − 3Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 6. Based on this information, the Stackelberg follower's reaction function is Multiple Choice: Q2 = 398 − 0.5Q2. Q2 = 199 − 0.5Q1. Q2 = 398 − 0.5Q1. Q2 = 199 − 0.5Q2.

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 12SQ: A common characteristic of oligopolies is a. interdependence in pricing decisions. b. independent...

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A common characteristic of oligopolies is a. interdependence in pricing decisions. b. independent pricing decisions. c. low industry concentration. d. few or no plant-level economies of scale.
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 400 − 2Q1 − 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 4. Based on this information, the Stackelberg follower's reaction function is a. Q2 = 99 − 0.5Q1. b. Q2 = 198 − 0.5Q1. c. Q2 = 198 − 0.5Q2. d. Q2 = 99 − 0.5Q2.
Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 400 − 3Q1 − 3Q2 . The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are Multiple Choice MR1(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 3Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 3Q1 − 6Q2. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 3Q1. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 3Q1 − 3Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 200 − Q1 − 3Q2. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 6Q2.
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2. The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi. Based on this information the Stackelberg follower's reaction function is Group of answer choices QF = 24.5 - 0.25QL. QF = 49 - 0.25QF. QF = (50/3) - (1/3)QL. QF = 24.5 - QL.
Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's reaction functions are: A. r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1 and r2(Q1) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2. B. r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2 and r2(Q1) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1. C. Q1 = 49 - 0.5Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.5Q1. D. Q1 = 49 - 0.25Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.25Q1. Please provide me with detail step by step process to get to the answer. coz no matter how many times I tried. my answer doesnt match the one in answer key
Consider a two-firm duopoly facing a linear demand curve: P = 1,600 – Q. Assume MCA = MCB = AC = 100. where: P = price Q = total output of the market, thus, Q = QA + QB Find the profit-maximizing output (Cournot equilibrium output) Find the Cournot equilibrium price of Firm A and Firm B.
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