Consider a town in which only two residents, Raphael and Susan, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Raphael and Susan can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars) 3.60 3.30 35 $115.50 $210.00 $283.50 $336.00 $367.50 $378.00 $367.50 $336.00 $283.50 $210.00 $115.50 3.00 70 2.70 105 2.40 140 2.10 175 1.80 210 1.50 245 1.20 280 0.90 315 0.60 350 0.30 385 420 Suppose Raphael and Susan form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is s agreement, Raphael and Susan agree to split production equally. Therefore, Raphael's profit is per gallon, and the total output is |gallons. As part of their cartel |, and Susan's profit is s Suppose that Raphael and Susan have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Raphael says to himself, "Susan and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." After Raphael implements his new plan, the price of water | per gallon. Given Susan and Raphael's production levels, Raphael's profit becomes and Susan's profit becomes 3 Because Raphael has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Susan decides that she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount. After Susan increases her production, Raphael's profit becomes 5 Susan's profit becomes S 1, and total profit (the sum of the profits of Raphael and Susan) is now

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter6: Simple Pricing
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 9MC
icon
Related questions
Question
Consider a town in which only two residents, Raphael and Susan, own wells that produce water
safe for drinking. Raphael and Susan can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost.
For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for
water.
Price
(Dollars per gallon)
3.60
Quantity Demanded Total Revenue
(Gallons of water)
(Dollars)
3.30
35
$115.50
$210.00
$283.50
$336.00
3.00
70
2.70
105
2.40
140
2.10
175
$367.50
1.80
210
$378.00
1.50
245
$367.50
1.20
280
$336.00
0.90
315
$283.50
0.60
350
$210.00
0.30
385
$115.50
420
Suppose Raphael and Susan form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price
is s
agreement, Raphael and Susan agree to split production equally. Therefore, Raphael's profit is
per gallon, and the total output is
gallons. As part of their cartel
and Susan's profit is s
Suppose that Raphael and Susan have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge
the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep,
Raphael says to himself, "Susan and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my
production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I
profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow."
increase my profit even though her
After Raphael implements his new plan, the price of water
to
per gallon. Given Susan and Raphael's production levels, Raphael's profit
becomes s
and Susan's profit becomes s
Because Raphael has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35
gallons more than the cartel amount, Susan decides that she will also increase her production to
35 gallons more than the cartel amount.
After Susan increases her production, Raphael's profit becomes $
, Susan's profit
becomes s
, and total profit (the sum of the profits of Raphael and Susan) is now
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a town in which only two residents, Raphael and Susan, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Raphael and Susan can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.60 Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.30 35 $115.50 $210.00 $283.50 $336.00 3.00 70 2.70 105 2.40 140 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00 1.50 245 $367.50 1.20 280 $336.00 0.90 315 $283.50 0.60 350 $210.00 0.30 385 $115.50 420 Suppose Raphael and Susan form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is s agreement, Raphael and Susan agree to split production equally. Therefore, Raphael's profit is per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel and Susan's profit is s Suppose that Raphael and Susan have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Raphael says to himself, "Susan and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." increase my profit even though her After Raphael implements his new plan, the price of water to per gallon. Given Susan and Raphael's production levels, Raphael's profit becomes s and Susan's profit becomes s Because Raphael has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Susan decides that she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount. After Susan increases her production, Raphael's profit becomes $ , Susan's profit becomes s , and total profit (the sum of the profits of Raphael and Susan) is now
True or False: Based on the fact that both Raphael and Susan increased production from the initial
cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was smaller than the price effect at that quantity.
True
o False
Note that Raphael and Susan started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Raphael decided to
cheat, Susan decided to cheat as well. In other words, Susan's output decisions are based on
Raphael's actions.
This behavior is an example of
Transcribed Image Text:True or False: Based on the fact that both Raphael and Susan increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was smaller than the price effect at that quantity. True o False Note that Raphael and Susan started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Raphael decided to cheat, Susan decided to cheat as well. In other words, Susan's output decisions are based on Raphael's actions. This behavior is an example of
Expert Solution
trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 6 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Profit Function
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Economics
ISBN:
9781305506381
Author:
James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:
Cengage Learning