Consider the following Cournot model. The inverse demand function is given by p = 30 –Q, where Q = q1 + q2. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $6 (c1 = 6). Firm 2 uses a new technology so that its marginal cost is $3 (c2 = 3). There is no fixed cost. The two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and compete only once. (So it’s a one-shot simultaneous game.) Answer the following questions. (4points)DeriveFirm1andFirm2’sreactionfunctions, respectively. (2 points) Solve the Nash equilibrium (q1N, q2N). (2points)Whatistheequilibriumpriceandwhatistheprofitlevel for each firm? (3 points) Suppose there is a market for the technology used by Firm 2. What is the highest price that Firm 1 is willing to pay for this new technology? (3points)Nowlet’schangethesetupfromCournotcompetitionto Bertrand competition, while maintaining all other assumptions. What is the equilibrium price? (3 points) Suppose the two firms engage in Bertrand competition. What is the highest price that Firm 1 is willing to pay for the new technology?

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter15: Imperfect Competition
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 15.5P
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Consider the following Cournot model.

  • The inverse demand function is given by p = 30 –Q, where Q =

    q1 + q2.

  • Firm 1’s marginal cost is $6 (c1 = 6). Firm 2 uses a new

    technology so that its marginal cost is $3 (c2 = 3). There is no

    fixed cost.

  • The two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and

    compete only once. (So it’s a one-shot simultaneous game.)

    Answer the following questions.

  1. (4points)DeriveFirm1andFirm2’sreactionfunctions, respectively.

  2. (2 points) Solve the Nash equilibrium (q1N, q2N).

  3. (2points)Whatistheequilibriumpriceandwhatistheprofitlevel for each firm?

  4. (3 points) Suppose there is a market for the technology used by Firm 2. What is the highest price that Firm 1 is willing to pay for this new technology?

  5. (3points)Nowlet’schangethesetupfromCournotcompetitionto Bertrand competition, while maintaining all other assumptions. What is the equilibrium price?

  6. (3 points) Suppose the two firms engage in Bertrand competition.

  7. What is the highest price that Firm 1 is willing to pay for the new technology?

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