Consider the following game with strategies A or B for both players 1 and 2. A> 0 applies. Spieler 2 A В А 2, а 0, 3 Spieler 1 B 3, 0 1, 1 (For the respective strategy combination, the left number corresponds to the payouts from player 1 and the right number to the payouts from player 2. Which of the following statements is correct? O 1. For a = 2 the strategy combination (A, A) is a Nash equilibrium. O 2. For all a> 0 it holds that the strategy combination (B, B) is the only Nash equilibrium. O 3. For a = 4 there are several Nash equilibria. O 4. Fora4, Ais the dominant strategyfor pleyer 2. O 5. For a = 2, player 2 has no dominant strategy.
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- 4 Consider an extensive game where player 1 starts with choosing of two actions, A or B. Player 2 observes player 1’s move and makes her move; if the move by player 1 is A, then player 2 can take three actions, X, Y or Z, if the move by player 1 is B, then player 2 can take of of two actions, U or V. Write down all teminal histories, proper subhistories, the player function and strategies of players in this game.What is the payoff for player 1 in the normal form game below: O. 3 O. 1 O. 0 O. 4a) Find the Nash equilibria in the game (in pure and mixed strategies) and the associated payoffs for the players. b) Now assume that the game is extended in the following way: in the beginning Player 1 can decide whether to opt out (this choice is denoted by O) or whether to play the simultaneous-move game in a) (this choice is denoted by G). If Player 1 opts out (plays O) then both Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of 4 each and the game ends. If Player 1 decides to play G, then the simultaneous-move game is played. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this extended version of the game. (Hint: note that Player 1 now has 4 strategies and write the game up in a 4x2 matrix.) c) Write the game in (b) up in extensive form (a game tree). Identify the subgames of this game.
- Use the following payoff matrix to answer the following questions. (LO2) Player 2 Strategies C D Player 1 A −10, −10 200, −100 B −100, 220 140, 180cSuppose this is a one-shot game: a. Determine the dominant strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. b. Determine the secure strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. c. Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game. If such an equilibrium does not exist, explain why not.You and a rival are engaged in a game in which there are three possible outcomes: you win, your rival wins (you lose), or the two of you tie. You get a payoff of 50 if you win, a payoff of 20 if you tie, and a payoff of 0 if you lose. What is your expected payoff in each of the following situations? (a) There is a 50% chance that the game ends in a tie, but only a 10% chance that you win. (There is thus a 40% chance that you lose.) (b) There is a 50–50 chance that you win or lose. There are no ties. (c) There is an 80% chance that you lose, a 10% chance that you win, and a 10% chance that you tie.Q17. What the information sets in the above game denote? Player 2 does not observe the action of player 1, so he does not know in which decision node he/she is playing at. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and b, or one between c and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played one between a and c, or one between b and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and d, or one between b and c.
- Q17. What the information sets in the above game denote? Player 2 does not observe the action of player 1, so he does not know in which decision node he/she is playing at. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and b, or one between c and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played one between a and c, or one between b and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and d, or one between b and c. Q18. If we want to describe the above game with a strategic form representation, what would the strategy sets for the three players? Player 1={a, b, c, d} ; Player 2={x, y} Player 1={a, b, c, d} ; Player 2={xx, xy, yx, yy}(a) Find all the Nash Equilibria, if there is any. (no explanation needed for this part (b) Does player 1 (choosing rows) have any dominant action? If yes, which action(s)? Any dominated action(s)? If yes, which ones? Answer the same questions for player 2, too. (c) If player 1 moves first (and player 2 moves next), what would be the sequentially rational equilibrium (draw the game tree and use backward induction)?What if player 2 moves first (and then player 1 moves next)? (d) Looking at your findings in (c), would player 1 want to move first or second or is she indifferent (the order doesn’t matter)?Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?
- ** Please be advsed that this is practice only from previous yeasr *** Answers: (a) There are no Nash equilibria.(b) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and no mixed strategy Nash equilibria.(c) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 1/2.(d) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 3/4.(e) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 3/4 and q = 1/2.A strategy for player 1 is a value for x1 from the set X. Similarly, a strategyfor player 2 is a value for x2 from the set X. Player 1’s payoff is V1(x1, x2) =5 + x1 - 2x2 and player 2’s payoff is V2(x1, x2) = 5 + x2 - 2x1.a. Assume that X is the interval of real numbers from 1 to 4 (including 1and 4). (Note that this is much more than integers and includes such numbers as 2.648 and 1.00037). Derive all Nash equilibria.b. Now assume that the game is played infinitely often and a player’s payoff is the present value of his stream of single-period payoffs, where dis the discount factor.(i) Assume that X is composed of only two values: 2 and 3; thus, aplayer can choose 2 or 3, but no other value. Consider the followingsymmetric strategy profile: In period 1, a player chooses the value 2. In period t(≥2), a player chooses the value 2. In period a player chooses the value 2 if both players chose 2 in all previous periods; otherwise, she chooses the value 3. Derive conditions which ensure…5 Suppose two players play one of the two normal-form games shown in Figure 1. L U 0,-1 D 2,4 R 2,0 6,0 L U | 4,-1 D 2,-2 R 2,0Now suppose that Player 2 knows which game is being played, but Player 1 does not. Find the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game.