Consider a 2 player game in which every player has two pure strategies. Which of the following is FALSE? O A If expected utility of an agent i from pure strategy aj is strictly higher than her expected utility from her pure strategy bị given an opponent mixed strategy s.j, then aj is the unique best resonse of agent i to S.j is aj. O B. If expected utility of an agent i from pure strategy aj is equal to her expected utility from her pure strategy bj given an opponent mixed strategy s.j, then agent i has a mixed strategy that is a best response of agent i to s.j. O Cif an agent i has a dominat pure strategy, then the expected utility of agent i from this dominant strategy is strcitly higher than her other pure startegy for all mixed strategies of her opponent.
Consider a 2 player game in which every player has two pure strategies. Which of the following is FALSE? O A If expected utility of an agent i from pure strategy aj is strictly higher than her expected utility from her pure strategy bị given an opponent mixed strategy s.j, then aj is the unique best resonse of agent i to S.j is aj. O B. If expected utility of an agent i from pure strategy aj is equal to her expected utility from her pure strategy bj given an opponent mixed strategy s.j, then agent i has a mixed strategy that is a best response of agent i to s.j. O Cif an agent i has a dominat pure strategy, then the expected utility of agent i from this dominant strategy is strcitly higher than her other pure startegy for all mixed strategies of her opponent.
Chapter18: Asymmetric Information
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 18.1P
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