In a small isolated town, there are two types of people, saints and crooks. In business dealings between any two residents of this town, the payoffs are below. Saint Crook Saint 8, 8 Crook 11,0 4,4 What percentage of this town's residents would be saints in an evolutionary stable strategy? Select one: O a. 40.42% O b. 60.20% O c. 55.26% O e. 57.14%
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- Consider an extensive game. First, a firm from City 1 (Player2) makes Betty (Player 1) a job offer. The offer promises an income y1. ThenBetty decides whether to accept the offer. If the o§er is accepted, the payffsto Betty and the firm are (y1 - x1; 1- y1), where x1 is the house price inCity 1. While Betty is contemplating over this o§er, she receives another joboffer from a firm in City 2. This outside option promises an income of y2and a house price x2. If Betty rejects Player 2ís offer and accepts the outsideoption, the payoffs to the two players are (y2 - x2; 0). If Betty rejects bothoffers, then the payo§s are (0; 0). Assume y1 > x1, y2 > x2, 0 < y1 < 1and y2 - x2 + x1 <=1 .assume that Betty will accept an offer if she isindifferent from accepting and rejecting it. Do the following: (a) Draw thegame tree. (b) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) by specifyingstrategies used. (c) What is Bettyís payoff in the SPE? How does this payoffchange respectively with…Consider the following variation to the Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S) game:• Suppose that the Player 1 (row player) has a single type, Normal.• Player 2 (column player) has two types Normal and Simple.• A player of Normal type plays this zero-sum game as we studied in class whereas a player of type Simple always play P.• Player 2 knows whether he is Normal or Simple, but player 1does not.a) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 1/3 and of type Simple with probability (2/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.b) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 2/3 and of type Simple with probability (1/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.Consider the following coordination game: Player 2P1 Comedy Show Concert Comedy Show 11,5 0,0 Concert 0,0 2,2 a. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) for this game.b. Now assume Player 1 and Player 2 have distributional preferences. Specifically, both people greatly care about the utility of the other person. In fact, they place equal weight on their outcome and the other person’soutcome, ρ = σ = ½. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) with these utilitarianpreferences.c. Now consider the case where Player1 and Player2 do not like each other. Specifically, any positive outcome for the other person is viewed as anegative outcome for the individual, ρ = σ = -1. Find the Nashequilibrium(s) with these envious preferences.
- 12. Consider a game where each player picks a number from 0 to 60. The guess that is closest to half ofthe average of the chosen numbers wins a prize. If several peopleare equally close, then they share theprize. The game theory implies that (A) all players have dominant strategies to choose 0 (B) all players have dominant strategies to choose 30 (C) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick 0 (D) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick positive numbers 13. Behavioral data in such games suggests that (A) most subjects choose 0; (B) most subjects choose 30; (C) common answers include 30, 15, 7.5, and 0; (D) most subjects use randomization. Can you help me answer number 13 please?You and a rival are engaged in a game in which there are three possible outcomes: you win, your rival wins (you lose), or the two of you tie. You get a payoff of 50 if you win, a payoff of 20 if you tie, and a payoff of 0 if you lose. What is your expected payoff in each of the following situations? (a) There is a 50% chance that the game ends in a tie, but only a 10% chance that you win. (There is thus a 40% chance that you lose.) (b) There is a 50–50 chance that you win or lose. There are no ties. (c) There is an 80% chance that you lose, a 10% chance that you win, and a 10% chance that you tie.We’ll now show how a college degree can get you a better job even if itdoesn’t make you a better worker. Consider a two-player game between aprospective employee, whom we’ll refer to as the applicant, and an employer. The applicant’s type is her intellect, which may be low, moderate,or high, with probability 1/3 , 1/2 , and 1/6 , respectively. After the applicantlearns her type, she decides whether or not to go to college. The personalcost in gaining a college degree is higher when the applicant is less intelligent, because a less smart student has to work harder if she is to graduate. Assume that the cost of gaining a college degree is 2, 4, and 6 for an applicant who is of high, moderate, and low intelligence, respectively.The employer decides whether to offer the applicant a job as a manageror as a clerk. The applicant’s payoff to being hired as a manager is 15,while the payoff to being a clerk is 10. These payoffs are independent ofthe applicant’s type. The employer’s payoff from…
- a Suppose you are given a choice between thefollowing options:A1: Win $30 for sureA2: 80% chance of winning $45 and 20% chance ofA2: winning nothing B1: 25% chance of winning $30B2: 20% chance of winning $45Most people prefer A1 to A2 and B2 to B1. Explainwhy this behavior violates the assumption that decisionmakers maximize expected utility.b Now suppose you play the following game: You havea 75% chance of winning nothing and a 25% chance ofplaying the second stage of the game. If you reach thesecond stage, you have a choice of two options (C1 andC2), but your choice must be made now, before youreach the second stage.C1: Win $30 for sureC2: 80% chance of winning $45 13.5 Bayes’ Rule and Decision Trees 767Most people choose C1 over C2 and B2 to B1 (from part(a)). Explain why this again violates the assumption ofexpected utility maximization. Tversky and Kahneman(1981) speculate that most people are attracted to thesure $30 in the second stage, even though the secondstage may never be…2. Consider a game that game theory people refer to as the “ultimatum game.”We will refer to our two players as the “offerer” and the “decider”. How the gameworks is that the offerer proposes a way to split $1000 between the two players.While this could be done in a variety of ways, we will assume that the offerersonly has two possible proposals: Either a 50-50 split, or she offers the decider$50 and keeps the rest. The decider can either accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the money is split as proposed. If the offer is rejected, themoney spontaneously combusts and nobody gets anything. a) List the strategies for each player and write an extensive form version of thegame with payouts. b) List all the Nash equilibria of this game. c) Explain which, if any of the Nash equilibrium are not sub-game perfect. d) Write the game out in normal form and find the pure strategy Nashequilibrium. Explain how this matches with your answers to (b) and (c) . Alsoexplain why there…4 Consider an extensive game where player 1 starts with choosing of two actions, A or B. Player 2 observes player 1’s move and makes her move; if the move by player 1 is A, then player 2 can take three actions, X, Y or Z, if the move by player 1 is B, then player 2 can take of of two actions, U or V. Write down all teminal histories, proper subhistories, the player function and strategies of players in this game.
- ** Please be advsed that this is practice only from previous yeasr *** Answers: (a) There are no Nash equilibria.(b) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and no mixed strategy Nash equilibria.(c) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 1/2.(d) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 3/4.(e) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 3/4 and q = 1/2.Consider Bernard \ Mary Left Center Right Top 0,5 1,0 2,2 Bottom 1,0 0,3 2,2 The first number in a cell denotes the payoff to Bernard and the second number denotes the payoff to MaryForexample: πB(B,L)=1and πM(T,L)=5. a Give all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this one-shot game, if any. Briefly explain.Let Bernard play Top with probability p and Bottom with probability 1 − p; let Mary play Left with probability qL , Center with probability qC and Right with probability qR = 1 − qL − qC . b Give all mixed strategy Nash equilibria of this game.For the operating systems game, let us now assume the intrinsic superiorityof Mac is not as great and that network effects are stronger for Windows.These modifications are reflected in different payoffs. Now, the payoff fromadopting Windows is 50 X w and from adopting Mac is 15 + 5 X m;n consumers are simultaneously deciding between Windows and Mac.a. Find all Nash equilibria.b. With these new payoffs, let us now suppose that a third option exists,which is to not buy either operating system; it has a payoff of 1,000.Consumers simultaneously decide among Windows, Mac, and nooperating system. Find all Nash equilibria.