Describe some interaction your company has with another entity (firms producing complementary or substitute products, upstream sup- pliers, or downstream customers), or between internal divisions within your firm that can be described as a sequential or simultaneous game. Diagram the strategies, players, and compute payoffs as best you can. Compute the Nash equilibria. What can you do to change the rules of the game to your advantage? Compute the profit consequences of your advice.

Describe some interaction your company has with another entity (firms producing complementary or substitute products, upstream sup- pliers, or downstream customers), or between internal divisions within your firm that can be described as a sequential or simultaneous game. Diagram the strategies, players, and compute payoffs as best you can. Compute the Nash equilibria. What can you do to change the rules of the game to your advantage? Compute the profit consequences of your advice.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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