During the pandemic, stockpiling behaviours have been criticized in the newspapers and described as irrational. From a game theory perspective, stockpiling of toilet paper or food can be modelled as a prisoner's dilemma game. a. Explain the strategic interactions behind the stockpiling behaviour. Does individual rationality lead to a socially desirable outcome? Why? b. Assume that we have two players who can choose between option 1: stockpiling food or toilet paper; and option 2: waiting to buy. They believe that there is a risk that supermarket will run out of stock. The following matrix gives the payoffs of each choice, where in each cell, the first number is the payoff of player A and the second number is the payoff of player B. Find the equilibrium by elimination of dominated strategies. Player B Waiting Stockpilling 6,6 2,8 Player A Waiting Stockpilling 8,2 4,4

During the pandemic, stockpiling behaviours have been criticized in the newspapers and described as irrational. From a game theory perspective, stockpiling of toilet paper or food can be modelled as a prisoner's dilemma game. a. Explain the strategic interactions behind the stockpiling behaviour. Does individual rationality lead to a socially desirable outcome? Why? b. Assume that we have two players who can choose between option 1: stockpiling food or toilet paper; and option 2: waiting to buy. They believe that there is a risk that supermarket will run out of stock. The following matrix gives the payoffs of each choice, where in each cell, the first number is the payoff of player A and the second number is the payoff of player B. Find the equilibrium by elimination of dominated strategies. Player B Waiting Stockpilling 6,6 2,8 Player A Waiting Stockpilling 8,2 4,4

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.3P

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