8 0.69384 0.77997 10 0.89265 Assume that buyers always bid according to the relevant symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy. Round all numeric answers to at least three decimal places. 00 Q2 Anglo-Dutch auction Consider an Anglo-Dutch auction in which one item is for sale. In the first-round of the auction, buyers bid in an ascending-bid auction. The two buyers with the highest bids proceed to the second round. In the second round, the two remaining buyers submit sealed bids (that cannot be lower than the price at which the bidding stopped in the first round) and the buyer with the highest bid wins the item and pays what he or she bid. Valuations are drawn from the uniform(0, 1) distribution. The following table depicts the valuations for each buyer in the auction. Buyer # 1 0.13134 0.18293 0.18709 4 0.20800 0.33763 6. 0.34580 7 0.35594

8 0.69384 0.77997 10 0.89265 Assume that buyers always bid according to the relevant symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy. Round all numeric answers to at least three decimal places. 00 Q2 Anglo-Dutch auction Consider an Anglo-Dutch auction in which one item is for sale. In the first-round of the auction, buyers bid in an ascending-bid auction. The two buyers with the highest bids proceed to the second round. In the second round, the two remaining buyers submit sealed bids (that cannot be lower than the price at which the bidding stopped in the first round) and the buyer with the highest bid wins the item and pays what he or she bid. Valuations are drawn from the uniform(0, 1) distribution. The following table depicts the valuations for each buyer in the auction. Buyer # 1 0.13134 0.18293 0.18709 4 0.20800 0.33763 6. 0.34580 7 0.35594

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter18: Auctions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5MC

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