Fajita Wagon: $500 Fajita Wagon: $4,000 Refer to t table above, which describes the payoffs to different pricing strategies for a duopo What set of strategies would be the Nash equilibrium for this game? The Fajita Wagon adopts a high price, and the Taco Bus adopts a high price. The Fajita Wagon earns $1,000 profit, and the Taco Bus earns $1,000 profit. The Fajita Wagon earns $4,000 profit, and the Taco Bus earns $4,000 profit.

Fajita Wagon: $500 Fajita Wagon: $4,000 Refer to t table above, which describes the payoffs to different pricing strategies for a duopo What set of strategies would be the Nash equilibrium for this game? The Fajita Wagon adopts a high price, and the Taco Bus adopts a high price. The Fajita Wagon earns $1,000 profit, and the Taco Bus earns $1,000 profit. The Fajita Wagon earns $4,000 profit, and the Taco Bus earns $4,000 profit.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter6: Demand Relationships Among Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6.4P

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Only typed answer and don't use chat gpt Refer to Figure 4.1, which shows Molly's and Ryan's individual demand curves for compact discs per month. Assuming Molly and Ryan are the only consumers in the market, if the market quantity demanded is 5, the price must be A. $3. B. $6. C. $9. D. $12.
In Autarka 2 amusement parks, Alfonso's wonderland and Bernice's rides there are 9600 people who like to visit an amusement park. Each of theseconsumers wants to visit one park once. The consumers' homes are evenly spaced acrossthe island, and they each suffer a disutility of $24 for each kilometre they travel to reachan amusement park. With their current technology, it costs an amusement park $12 for each customer theyhost. At present, the equilibrium price for an amusement park ticket is $36, and each firmhas a profit of $115,200. This market is best modelled as Hotelling competition. Fixed costs should be neglected. Treat this market as a one-shot game. Do not consider repetition or associated phenomena such as collusion or predatory pricing. Assuming Bernice's rides has a profit function of Nb(Pa,Pb) = 200(PaPb - Pb^2 + 36Pb -12Pa - 288), what is Bernice's rides best response function?
In Autarka 2 amusement parks, Alfonso's wonderland and Bernice's rides there are 9600 people who like to visit an amusement park. Each of theseconsumers wants to visit one park once. The consumers' homes are evenly spaced acrossthe island, and they each suffer a disutility of $24 for each kilometre they travel to reachan amusement park. With their current technology, it costs an amusement park $12 for each customer theyhost. At present, the equilibrium price for an amusement park ticket is $36, and each firmhas a profit of $115,200. This market is best modelled as Hotelling competition. Fixed costs should be neglected. Treat this market as a one-shot game. Do not consider repetition or associated phenomena such as collusion or predatory pricing. Find the profit function for Alfonso's Wonderland for the case in which their marginal cost is $6.
Let us take another look at the supply and demand of widgets as outlined in our previous Assignment No. 3: Price (P): $40 $35 $30 $25 $20 $15 $10 $5 $0 Quantity Demanded (QD): 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Quantity Supplied (QS): 36 32 28 24 20 16 8 4 0 Use Excel charts to show how the supply and demand curves would shift if the sellers would all of a sudden be willing to sell 4 additional units (beyond what the above table suggests) at any given price, and at the same time that the buyers would reduce the amount that they would be willing to buy at any given price by 5 units. What would be the new equilibrium price and quantity after this happens?
Assume you have your car broken down just before the weekend. You value your weekend trip as muchas v and if you have to stay home you get the zero utility. There are two dealerships in your town. Atthe beginning of the day they simultaneously choose a price for repair. Dealers know that when you cometo one of them and observe the price, you can always call to another dealer to make an inquiry about hisprice. The call is costless. The other dealer, however, can be occupied for this day. Assume, this happenswith probability which is a common knowledge (but the dealers do not know whether the other dealer isoccupied or not). Assume zero repair cost for the dealer and find a symmetric equilibrium of the game.
For Washburn, what are examples of (a) shiftingthe demand curve to the right to get a higher pricefor a guitar line (movement of the demand curve)and (b) pricing decisions involving moving along ademand curve?
In Autarka 2 amusement parks, Alfonso's wonderland and Bernice's rides there are 9600 people who like to visit an amusement park. Each of these consumers wants to visit one park once. The consumers' homes are evenly spaced across the island, and they each suffer a disutility of $24 for each kilometre they travel to reachan amusement park. With their current technology, it costs an amusement park $12 for each customer theyhost. At present, the equilibrium price for an amusement park ticket is $36, and each firmhas a profit of $115,200. This market is best modelled as Hotelling competition. Fixed costs should be neglected. Treat this market as a one-shot game. Do not consider repetition or associated phenomena such as collusion or predatory pricing. Assuming the profit function for Alfonso's Wonderland is Na(Pa,Pb) = 200(PaPb - Pb^2 + 30Pb -6Pa - 144) Find their best-response function in which their marginal cost is $6.
9. Below is the total benefit Kenneth estimates he would get for jars of chocolate-flavored hazelnut butter. Jars Total Benefit (dollars) 1 5 2 9 3 12 4 14 5 15 6 14 7 10 What is Kenneth's optimal quantity consumed if the price of each jar is $4? 1 2 4 5 7 12. What will happen to the market supply curve of gadgets if a new gadget producer enters the market? It will not change. It will become more elastic. There is insufficient data to determine. It will shift right at every price with more output supplied. It will shift left at every price with less output supplied.
Juanita is deciding whether to buy a skirt that she wants, as well as where to buy it. Three stores carry the same skirt, but it is more convenient for Juanita to get to some stores than others. For example, she can go to her local store, located 15 minutes away from where she works, and pay a marked-up price of $102 for the skirt: Store Travel Time Each Way Price of a Skirt (Minutes) (Dollars per skirt) Local Department Store 15 102 Across Town 30 85 Neighboring City 60 76 Juanita makes $42 an hour at work. She has to take time off work to purchase her skirt, so each hour away from work costs her $42 in lost income. Assume that returning to work takes Juanita the same amount of time as getting to a store and that it takes her 30 minutes to shop. As you answer the following questions, ignore the cost of gasoline and depreciation of her car when traveling.
Please no written by hand solutions and no image. 3. Given the following information; solve the consumer's problem by finding the optimal demand functions for X and Y: U(X, Y) = X ^ (1/3) * Y ^ (2/3) Also, you are given the following initial market conditions: Px =\$6 Py =\$4 M =\$360 a. Setup the Optimization Problem b. Find the First Order Conditions of Optimization c. Find X ^ * and Y ^ * d. Graph the solution and explain the economic intuition behind the graph: i.e. What are the conditions met at the optimal bundle? Introduce another consumption bundle and explain why it is NOT the optimal. e. If income doubles, what will the new x ^ * and Y ^ * be? f. If your preferences change and you prefer X and Y equally; illustrate how the consumer's optimization problem might change and solve for the new X ^ * and Y ^ * under your new model.
Let Qd=1600-300P ; and Qs=1400+700P for dark chocolate bars. Explain and illustrate the changes in equilibrium if a. Ads featuring dark chocolate as "good for the heart" b. Price of cocoa becomes cheaper and the ad enticed consumers to buy more
Paula hires Alfred to manage her store. The left column of the table below shows Alfred’s possible effort levels—low and high. Alfred’s personal disutility in terms of dollars depends on his effort level is shown in the second column. The two right columns show the different profits to Priscilla (before paying Alfred’s salary and ignoring his cost of effort) under Low- and High- demand conditions. effort level alfreds cost to effort low demand profit high demand profit low $0 $20 $60 high $10 $60 $100 It is equally likely that demand will be High or Low: chances are 50/50, regardless of how much effort Alfred exerts. They consider two possible contracts: i. Fixed Wage: Alfred receives a fixed wage of $15 ii. Profit Sharing: Alfred receives a share x of the store’s profits but no wage. Assume, to simplify matters, that both Alfred and Paula are risk neutral. Calculate the net expected payoffs for Alfred and Paula under each possible contract offered by Paula…