Given a market demand Q=200-2P and 2 firms in a cartel model with Firm A's total cost TCA=5qA² +qA, Firm B's total cost is TCg= 8qg²+298, Q=qA+qg, the profit maximizing output for Firm A can be computed by equating the O none of these O (100-0.5Q²) and the partial derivative of (TCA + TCB) with respect to q partial derivative of TCA with respect to q and the partial derivative of TR-100-0.5qA² -0.5q² with respect to qa partial derivative of (TCA + TCB) with respect to q, and the partial derivative of TR-100-0.5qA² -0.5qB² with respect to q O (100-0.5Q²) and the partial derivative of TC, with respect to q

Given a market demand Q=200-2P and 2 firms in a cartel model with Firm A's total cost TCA=5qA² +qA, Firm B's total cost is TCg= 8qg²+298, Q=qA+qg, the profit maximizing output for Firm A can be computed by equating the O none of these O (100-0.5Q²) and the partial derivative of (TCA + TCB) with respect to q partial derivative of TCA with respect to q and the partial derivative of TR-100-0.5qA² -0.5q² with respect to qa partial derivative of (TCA + TCB) with respect to q, and the partial derivative of TR-100-0.5qA² -0.5qB² with respect to q O (100-0.5Q²) and the partial derivative of TC, with respect to q

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.6P

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