Health insurance is normally seen as a good that is most valuable to sick people, since health expenditures are highest for the sick. Yet, in the basic insurance model discussed in this chapter, actuarially-fair health insurance is worth nothing to people who are certain to become sick (p = 1). Why does the standard model produce this result? How is this different from the way real-world insurance markets work?

Health insurance is normally seen as a good that is most valuable to sick people, since health expenditures are highest for the sick. Yet, in the basic insurance model discussed in this chapter, actuarially-fair health insurance is worth nothing to people who are certain to become sick (p = 1). Why does the standard model produce this result? How is this different from the way real-world insurance markets work?

Economics (MindTap Course List)

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617383

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter30: Market Failure: Externalities, Public Goods, And Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15QP

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