Use a two-state model with clearly marked labels to show the following statements: a) People with different risk profiles (ie., risk-secking vs. risk-neutral vs. risk-averse) have different expected utility curves. b) A risk-neutral person can be indifferent to a full insurance (compared to no insurance). c) A risk-seeking person does not like the idea of diversification d) For-sure outcomes with higher payoffs are preferred to for-sure outcomes with lower payoffs.

Use a two-state model with clearly marked labels to show the following statements: a) People with different risk profiles (ie., risk-secking vs. risk-neutral vs. risk-averse) have different expected utility curves. b) A risk-neutral person can be indifferent to a full insurance (compared to no insurance). c) A risk-seeking person does not like the idea of diversification d) For-sure outcomes with higher payoffs are preferred to for-sure outcomes with lower payoffs.

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter4: Economic Evaluation In Health Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3QAP

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Health insurance is normally seen as a good that is most valuable to sick people, since health expenditures are highest for the sick. Yet, in the basic insurance model discussed in this chapter, actuarially-fair health insurance is worth nothing to people who are certain to become sick (p = 1). Why does the standard model produce this result? How is this different from the way real-world insurance markets work?
Which of the following are examples of common behavioral errors in decision making (multiple correct answers; check all that apply). A. Always paying more than true willingness to pay. B. Letting unrecoverable sunk costs influence ongoing decisions for when such costs have no bearing on benefits and costs going forward. C. Making different decisions when an identical problem is framed in two different ways, especially when one is framed in terms of gains and the other in terms of losses. D. Always saving too little. E. Generally spending too little on high-quality, high-priced items. F. Settling on a default alternative in the face of a difficult or complex decision G. Considering the average cost and average benefit, instead of the marginal cost and marginal benefit, When choosing whether a little more or less should be bought or produced.
Consider the following claim: “If a decision maker prefers one given lottery that yields $x with probability 1 over another given lottery whose expected return is $x, then we can fully characterize the agent's risk attitude. That is, this information comparing two given lotteries is enough to determine if the decision maker is risk averse, risk loving or risk neutral.” If this claim is TRUE, then provide a proof. If it is FALSE, then prove your argument by providing an explanation.
A risk-averse manager is considering two projects. The first project involves expanding the market for bologna; the second involves expanding the market for caviar. There is a 10 percent chance of a recession and a 90 percent chance of an economic boom. During a boom, the bologna project will lose $10,000, whereas the caviar project will earn $20,000. During a recession, the bologna project will earn $12,000 and the caviar project will lose $8,000. If the alternative is earning $3,000 on a safe asset (say, a Treasury bill), what should the manager do? Why?
The statement "risk requires compensation" implies that people: Answer a. Do not take risk b. Only accept risk when they absolutely have to c. Will only accept risk when they are rewarded for doing so d. Avoid risk at all cost
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function ( sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 Calculate Lex’s and Tess' expected utilities without insurance. (each one separated) Round to two decimal places for both
Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function c. Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. 1. Suppose the actuarially fair premium charge is 2600, Calculate Tess’ expected utility with full insurance if she is charged the premium. Round to two decimal places. 2. What is the premium that private insurance companies will charge for full insurance? Round to two decimal places. 3.Assume the social welfare function is the sum of the Tess’ and Lex’s utility functions. Select the correct statement regarding the explanation for what has happened in the private market and the role of social insurance. a.Adverse section has lead to market failure. The government could improve social welfare by…
Consider two individuals whose utility function over wealth I is ?(?) = √?. Both people face a 10 percent chance of getting sick, and foreach the total cost of illness equals $50,000. Suppose person A has a total net worth of $100,000, and person B has a total net worth of $1,000,000. Both people have the option to buy an actuarially fair insurance contract that would fully insure them against the cost of the illness. a. Using expected utility calculations, show that person A would certainly buy full, actuarially fair insurance. b. Suppose an insurance company wants to maximize profits and wants to charge each customer the maximum price they are willing to pay. How much should the insurance company charge each client so that both buy the contract? c. What is surprising about your result in part b? What does this tell you about how insurance companies may be pricing health insurance contracts in the real world?
Suppose in a given state's new insurance marketplace, with community rating and no restrictions on who can buy at the community rate, the risk pool (distribution of expected health costs) is as follows: 30% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $1,000 (per year)65% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $2,0005% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $10,000 Now suppose one insurer, and one insurer only, were allowed to offer any premium it wanted to any potential buyer and to exclude those it did not want to cover? What premium would they likely charge and who would they sell to and who would they exclude? What would happen to the other insurers? Does this help you see why the ACA was written to apply to all insurers?
The governments role in terrorism insurance is that of - disinterested observer - innocent bystander - a reinsurance provider of last resort/ re-insurer
Suppose one uses the single-index model to estimate characteristics of securities.Which of the following statements is correct? (a)The covariances between securities are the same as in the data. (b)The variance of a portfolio is the same as in the data. (c)The expected return and the variance of a security are the same as in the data. (d)The expected return,variance and covariances of a security are the same as in the da
Beta and volatility differ as risk measures in that beta measures only non‑systematic risk, while volatility measures total risk. True False