How Cournot and Stackelberg models are different? In Cournot profits are zero and in Stackelberg profits are zero. In Stackelberg, both firms make output decisions simultaneously, and in Cournot, one firm sets its output level first. In Cournot, a firm has the opportunity to react to its rival. In Cournot, both firms make output decisions simultaneously, and in Stackelberg, one firm sets its output level first.

How Cournot and Stackelberg models are different? In Cournot profits are zero and in Stackelberg profits are zero. In Stackelberg, both firms make output decisions simultaneously, and in Cournot, one firm sets its output level first. In Cournot, a firm has the opportunity to react to its rival. In Cournot, both firms make output decisions simultaneously, and in Stackelberg, one firm sets its output level first.

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)

9th Edition

ISBN:9781305260948

Author:Irvin B. Tucker

Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19SQ

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