In a small business, there are two players: the boss and the employee. The employee has to choose whether to undergo training or not. The training costs Php1000. Now, the boss has to decide whether to pay a fixed wage of Php10000 to the employee or share the total profit of the small business exactly half to the employee. The total profit depends on the training and profit sharing. With no training and fixed wage, the total profit is Php20000. If either training or profit sharing is implemented, the total profit rises to Php22000. If both training and profit sharing are implemented, the total profit is Php25000. Let the employee be the row player and the boss be the column player. If the employee does not undergo training and the boss decides on fixed wage, what is the payoff ordered pair for this scenario? (9000,12000) O (11500,12500) O (11000,11000) ০ (10000,10000)
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