4. $1000 with of $325. (a) (b) Adam is risk averse. He is offered a choice between a gamble that pays a probability of 25% and $100 with a probability of 75%, or a sure payment What is the expected payment of the gamble? Will Adam prefer gamble over sure payment? Would he change his mind if the sure payment is $320 instead of $325? (c) If this individual has a utility function u(x) = lnx, would he prefer the payment of $320 or the gamble? (d) In the CRRA utility family u(x) = x¹7. If this individual has a 0.01, would he prefer the payment of $320 or the gamble? utility where y =

4. $1000 with of $325. (a) (b) Adam is risk averse. He is offered a choice between a gamble that pays a probability of 25% and $100 with a probability of 75%, or a sure payment What is the expected payment of the gamble? Will Adam prefer gamble over sure payment? Would he change his mind if the sure payment is $320 instead of $325? (c) If this individual has a utility function u(x) = lnx, would he prefer the payment of $320 or the gamble? (d) In the CRRA utility family u(x) = x¹7. If this individual has a 0.01, would he prefer the payment of $320 or the gamble? utility where y =

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

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Givenu(x)=x0.5 Lottery A Probability 0.50 0.25 0.25 Outcome 64 16 0 For automatic grading, give all numerical answers to exactly two decimal places. Do not include currency signs 1) What is the expected value? (Give the answer as 36.00, not 36) 2) What is the expected utility? 3) What is the certainty equivalent? (Number only) 4) What is the risk premium? 5) Would this person rather receive 20 for sure than play Lottery A? (Answer should be Y or N for auto-grading to work) 6) (Harder) In many applications of expected utility, it is possible to lose money. The usual way of handling this is to interpret utility in terms of final wealth. Suppose it costs money to play this lottery. If starting wealth is 100, calculate the expected utility of playing lottery A if the price of playing is 15. Your answer should be to two decimal places. (Note: calculating the certainty equivalent of the lottery would be a little different than we've done in class. Squaring your EU result would give…
8 An investor with initial wealth $20000 and utility function U(x) = ln(x) is considering an investment that has a 80% chance of gaining r% and a 20% chance of losing s%. (1) Find in terms of r and s the certainty equivalent of this investment. (2) If s = 10, find the range of values of r for which the investor will avoid this investment.,
Microeconomics Wilfred’s expected utility function is px1^0.5+(1−p)x2^0.5, where p is the probability that he consumes x1 and 1 - p is the probability that he consumes x2. Wilfred is offered a choice between getting a sure payment of $Z or a lottery in which he receives $2500 with probability p = 0.4 and $3700 with probability 1 - p. Wilfred will choose the sure payment if Z > CE and the lottery if Z < CE, where the value of CE is equal to ___ (please round your final answer to two decimal places if necessary)
Consider Bob's decision problem: Sunny Cloudy Rainy Beach 2 3 2 Park 3 3 2 Mall -1 1 x Suppose the probability of Sunny is 0.25, the probability of Cloudy is 0.25, and the probability of Rainy is 0.5. What is the smallest value of x for which Mall is an expected utility maximiser? Round your answer to one decimal place (e.g. 0.5).
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6) For the payoff table below, the decision maker will use P(s1) = .15, P(s2) = .5, and P(s3) = .35. s1 s2 s3 d1 -5000 1000 10,000 d2 -15,000 -2000 40,000 (a) What alternative would be chosen according to expected value? (b) For a lottery having a payoff of 40,000 with probability p and -15,000 with probability (1-p), the decision maker expressed the following indifference probabilities. Payoff Probability 10,000 .85 1000 .60 -2000 .53 -5000 .50 Let U(40,000) = 10 and U(-15,000) = 0 and find the utility value for each payoff. (c) What alternative would be chosen according to expected utility?
1. Now, imagine that Port Chester decides to crack down on motorists who park illegally by increasing the number of officers issuing parking tickets (thus, raising the probability of a ticket). If the cost of a ticket is $100, and the opportunity cost for the average driver of searching for parking is $12, which of the following probabilities would make the average person stop parking illegally? Assume that people will not park illegally if the expected value of doing so is negative. Check all that apply. A. 9% B. 18% C. 17% D. 10% 2. Alternatively, the city could hold the number of officers constant and discourage parking violations by raising the fine for illegal parking. Suppose the average probability of getting caught for parking illegally is currently 10% citywide, and the average opportunity cost of parking is, again, $12. The fine that would make the average person indifferent between searching for parking and parking illegally is ____ , assuming that people will not…
#2. Hannah gets 50 utils from visiting her family for Thanksgiving. But there is a 1% chance that she will get the coronavirus from them. If she gets the coronavirus, her utility is -6000 utils. Her total utility would be -5950 (i.e. 50 – 6000). She gets 0 utils from staying healthy (total utility = 50 + 0 = 50). What is her expected utility? a. 50 utils b. -6 utils c. -10 utils d. -5999.5 utils e. -6000 utils f. None of these #3. Hannah gets 50 utils from visiting her family for Thanksgiving. But there is a 1% chance that she will get the coronavirus from them. If she gets the coronavirus, her utility is -6000 utils. Her total utility would be -5950 (i.e. 50 – 6000). She gets 0 utils from staying healthy (total utility = 50 + 0 = 50). If Hannah doesn't visit her family for Thanksgiving, then she gets -25 utils from eating turkey cold cuts alone in front of the TV. In that case, there is no risk of getting sick. What will Hannah do? a. Visit her family for Thanksgiving b. Not visit her…
a. Suppose that you took part in a lottery that has a chance to increase, decrease or have no effect on your level of income. With probability 0.5, your income remains at it original level K500; with 0.2 probability, your income increases to K700; and with probability 0.3, your income decreases to K400. The utility function is.u（1） =I^0.7where I denote income leveli.Using the utility function show that the consumer's risk preference is averse. (2marks)ii.Calculate both the EU and EV of the income. (4marks)iii.Using the results in (il) above, indicate the attitude to risk of this consumer. (2marks)
Suppose Grace and Lisa are to go to dinner. Lisa is visiting Grace from outof town, and they are to meet at a local restaurant. When Lisa lived in town,they had two favorite restaurants: Bel Loc Diner and the Corner Stable. Ofcourse, Lisa’s information is out of date, but Grace knows which is betterthese days. Assume that the probability that the Bel Loc Diner is better isp > 1/2 and the probability that the Corner Stable is better is 1 - p. Naturedetermines which restaurant Grace thinks is better. Grace then sends amessage to Lisa, either “Let’s go to the Bel Loc Diner,” “Let’s go to theCorner Stable,” or “I don’t know [which is better].” Lisa receives the message, and then Grace and Lisa simultaneously decide which restaurant to go to. Payoffs are such that Grace and Lisa want to go to the same restaurant, but they prefer it to be the one that Grace thinks is better. More specifically, if, in fact, the Bel Loc Diner is better, then the payoffs from theiractions are as shown in the…
5. Investor attitudes toward risk Suppose an investor, Erik, is offered the investment opportunities described in the table below. Each investment costs $1,000 today and provides a payoff, also described below, one year from now. Option Payoff One Year from Now 1 100% chance of receiving $1,100 2 50% chance of receiving $1,000; 50% chance of receiving $1,200 3 50% chance of receiving $200; 50% chance of receiving $2,000 If Erik is risk averse, which investment will he prefer? The investor will choose option 1. The investor will choose option 2. The investor will choose option 3. The investor will be indifferent toward these options. Suppose the market risk premium is currently 6%. If investors were to become more risk-averse, the market risk premium might increase to 8%. What effect would you expect this to have on the prices of most financial assets? Prices would be unaffected. Prices would decrease. Prices would increase.