In the famous court case Stambovsky v. Ackley a prospective homebuyer attempts to back out of a purchase after learning that the home was widely believed to be haunted since the current owner had it included in a tour of haunted homes. Prior to the prospective buyer backing out, what imperfect information situation applied to this situation? Explain.

In the famous court case Stambovsky v. Ackley a prospective homebuyer attempts to back out of a purchase after learning that the home was widely believed to be haunted since the current owner had it included in a tour of haunted homes. Prior to the prospective buyer backing out, what imperfect information situation applied to this situation? Explain.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter19: The Problem Of Adverse Selection

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.5IP

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What impact do asymmetric and imperfect information have on prices and quantities? Group of answer choices An unstable equilibrium. A decline in prices or quantities of products sold. One party (buyer/seller) will always be unhappy. One party will be made better off, and the other party will be made worse off.
Many police officer positions require the applicant to have a college degree even though the tasks of a police officer rarely call upon college course material. Speculate on why police departments do not increase their applicant pool by dropping this requirement and how asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection are involved?
In the mid-1990s, the state of New Jersey revised its rules for the individual insurance market and began requiring that insurers charge the same premiums for the same coverage to all applicants. Assuming that insurers had previously used medical underwriting, which of the following is a predictable consequence of adverse selection? 1) Insurance becomes less attractive to the healthiest individuals, so fewer of them buy it 2) Insurers’ average costs of providing coverage increase because of a changing risk pool 3) The average age of those buying in the individual market goes up 4) All of the above
Show that expectation damages are efficient with respect to breach, but not efficient with respect to reliance.
BPO Services is in the business of digitizing information from forms that are filled out by hand. In 2006, a big client gave BPO a distribution of the forms that it digitized in house last year, and BPO estimated how much it would cost to digitize each form. Form Type Mix of Forms Form Cost A 0.5 $3.00 B 0.5 $1.00 The expected cost of digitizing a form is . Suppose the client and BPO agree to a deal, whereby the client pays BPO to digitize forms. The price of each form processed is equal to the expected cost of the form that you calculated in the previous part of the problem. Suppose that after the agreement, the client sends only forms of type A. The expected digitization cost per form of the forms sent by the client is . This leads to an expected loss of per form for BPO. (Hint: Do not round your answers. Enter the loss as a positive number.)
What are some ways a seller of goods might reassure a possible buyer who is faced with imperfect information?
The governments role in terrorism insurance is that of - disinterested observer - innocent bystander - a reinsurance provider of last resort/ re-insurer
Consider the following abstract from the following research paper “Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry” by C. Kirabo Jackson and Henry Schneider: “This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of agents in settings with incomplete contracts. Specifically, the study examines the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes [like gas overuse and accidents] than owner-drivers due to moral hazard… We find that drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard, representing an improvement… of the outcome measures.” 1. Thinking of moral hazard, draw an analogy between the taxi leasing industry and health insurance. Specifically, briefly highlight the following aspects Price distortion effects Behaviour change due to price sensitivity Information asymmetry Social loss 2. The paper…
Which of the following statements is FALSE regarding the concept of "adverse selection"? Multiple Choice Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss. Adverse selection occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured. This can happen, for example, when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. The relationship between smoking status and mortality provides a good illustration for adverse selection, especially in the case in which a life insurance company did not vary its premiums according to smoking status of its customers. To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers may offer premiums that are proportional to a customer's risk.
Suppose that left-handed people are more prone to injury than right-handed people. Lefties have an 80 percent chance of suffering an injury leading to a $1,000 loss (in terms of medical expenses and the monetary equivalent of pain and suffering) but righties have only a 20 percent chance of suffering such an injury. The population contains equal numbers of lefties and righties. Individuals all have logarithmic utility-of-wealth functions and initial wealth of $10,000. Insurance is provided by a monopoly company. a.Compute the “first best” for the monopoly insurer b.Try to characterize the “second best” contracts as well as you can (start from the profit maximization problem and write down the four relevant constraints, point out which constraints matter, which ones don’t, proceed as much as you can, etc.). In addition: assume perfectly competitive insurance market instead of monopoly, and find (i) the first best and (ii) the second-best contracts.
Which is not an example of asymmetric information? Group of answer choices A customer not knowing which insurance plan is best A client making a purchase of a used private airplane of unknown condition A mail carrier making her deliveries An insurer not having the full information about a client’s drug use A tree service recommending needless pruning on fruit trees is an example of: Group of answer choices adverse selection. mutually beneficial trades. moral hazard. a trade fallacy.
Suppose that left-handed people are more prone to injury than right-handed people. Lefties have an 80 percent chance of suffering an injury leading to a $1,000 loss (in terms of medical expenses and the monetary equivalent of pain and suffering) but righties have only a 20 percent chance of suffering such an injury. The population contains equal numbers of lefties and righties. Individuals all have logarithmic utility-of-wealth functions and initial wealth of $10,000. Assume perfectly competitive insurance market and find (i) the first best and (ii) the second-best contracts.