In the market for used cars, there are two types of cars: bad cars, or good cars. The sellers know the qualities of the cars, and they value bad cars at $100 and good cars at $1000. The buyers cannot observe the quality of the cars, and they are willing to pay $100 for a bad car, and $1000 for a good car. Assume that buyers can only offer the same buying price for any car in the market (i.e., buyers cannot discriminate among sellers). What is the equilibrium price in such a market for used cars? a) $550 b) $100 c) $1000 d) Between $100 and $1000 e) This is a case of adverse selection. The equilibrium price cannot be determined.
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In the market for used cars, there are two types of cars: bad cars, or good cars. The sellers know the qualities of the cars, and they value bad cars at $100 and good cars at $1000. The buyers cannot observe the quality of the cars, and they are willing to pay $100 for a bad car, and $1000 for a good car. Assume that buyers can only offer the same buying
any car in the market (i.e., buyers cannot discriminate among sellers). What is the
a) $550
b) $100
c) $1000
d) Between $100 and $1000
e) This is a case of adverse selection. The equilibrium price cannot be determined.
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- Suppose that there are 2 types of plans available to you. Plan A has a deductible of $500, with 10 percent co-insurance rate for many health care services. Plan B has a deductible fo $1000, with 35 percent co-insurance rate. Plan A costs $200 per month in premiums while Plan B costs $80. Discuss characteristics of people who would choose Plan A versus Plan B. Assuming that both plan types exist in the market, who would likely choose Plan B over Plan A? What plan would you choose?Suppose two bidders compete for a single indivisible item (e.g., a used car, a piece of art, etc.). We assume that bidder 1 values the item at $v1, and bidder 2 values the item at $v2. We assume that v1 > v2. In this problem we study a second price auction, which proceeds as follows. Each player i = 1, 2 simultaneously chooses a bid bi ≥ 0. The higher of the two bidders wins, and pays the second highest bid (in this case, the other player’s bid). In case of a tie, suppose the item goes to bidder 1. If a bidder does not win, their payoff is zero; if the bidder wins, their payoff is their value minus the second highest bid. a) Now suppose that player 1 bids b1 = v2 and player 2 bids b2 = v1, i.e., they both bid the value of the other player. (Note that in this case, player 2 is bidding above their value!) Show that this is a pure NE of the second price auction. (Note that in this pure NE the player with the lower value wins, while in the weak dominant strategy equilibrium where both…A seller sells a good of quality q at a price t. The cost of producing at quality level q is given by q2/2. There is a buyer who receives a utility of Xq − t by consuming the unit of quality q at price t. If he decides not to buy, he gets a utility of zero. X can take two values X1 = 1 and X2 = 4. (a) Suppose the seller can observe X. Derive the profit maximizing price-quality pairs offered when the type is X1 = 1 and when the type is X2 = 4. (b) Show that the full information price-quality pairs are not incentive compatible if the seller cannot observe X.
- Suppose the equilibrium price for good quality used cars is $20,000. And the equilibrium price for poor quality used cars is $10,000. Assume a potential used car buyer has imperfect information as to the condition of any given used car. Assume this potential buyer believes the probability a given used car is good quality is .60 and the probability a given used car is low quality is .40. Assume the seller has perfect information on all cars in inventory. How does the informational imbalance result in market failure? a. Only good quality cars are sold, hence the market under-provides used cars. b. Both poor and good quality cars are sold, hence the market over-provides used cars. c. Only poor quality cars are sold, hence the market under-provides used cars. d. Both poor and good quality cars are sold, hence the market efficiently provides used cars.Consider the model of the market for lemons from Chapter 22. Suppose that there are two types of used cars — good ones and lemons — and that sellers know which type of car they have. Buyers do not know which type of car a seller has. The fraction of used cars of each type is 21 and buyers know this. Let’s suppose that a seller who has a good car values it at $10,000 and a seller with a lemon values the lemon at $5,000. A seller is willing to sell his car for any price greater than or equal to his value for the car; the seller is not willing to sell the car at a price below the value of the car. Buyers’ values for good cars and lemons are $14,000 and $8,000, respectively. As in Chapter 22 we will assume that buyers are risk-neutral; that is, they are willing to pay their expected value of a car. (a) Is there an equilibrium in the used-car market in which all types of cars are sold? Briefly explain.(b) Is there an equilibrium in the used-car market in which only lemons are sold? Briefly…Consider a market for used cars in which buyers would pay up to $18,000 for an orange (good used car) and $8,000 for a lemon. The owners of oranges will accept no less than $12,500 while owners of lemons will accept no less than $3,000. Assume that buyers always end up paying their full willingness to pay and that the fraction of oranges in the population is known to be f. If sellers can observe the type of car but buyers can’t, what is the minimum value of f such that the market for oranges does not collapse?
- Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. Under a negligence standard, what is…Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. Under a negligence standard, what are…Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this…
- Consider two bidders – Alice and Bob who are bidding for a second-hand car. Each of them knows the private value she/he assigns to the car, but does not know the exact value of others. It is common knowledge that the value of other bidders is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and $10000. Assume that Alice values the car at $8500 and Bob values the car at $4500. a) If Alice and Bob participated in the second-price sealed bid auction, what would they bid and what would be the result of the auction? Explain your answer. b) If they participate instead in a first-price sealed bid auction, what would they bid and what would be the result of the auction? Explain your answer. c) Calculate and compare the revenue of the seller in the above situations. Which type of auction should the seller use? Explain your answerConsider a used car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential buyers. Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be a low quality “lemon.” a. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad used cars are worth $5,000. What is the average value of a used car? b. By how much does the average value exceed the value of a bad used car? By how much does the value of a good used car exceed the average value? c. Would a potential seller of a good used car be willing to accept the average value as payment for her vehicle? d. If a buyer negotiates with a seller to purchase the seller’s used car for a price equal to the average value, is the car more likely to be good or bad? e. Will the used-car market come to feature mostly—if not exclusively—lemons? How…In this version of the ultimatum game experiment, one participant is given £100, and is told to offer to split that amount with another participant. The second player can either refuse to accept the division, in which case the participant receiving the £100 has to give it back, or can accept the division, in which case, the player receiving the money splits the £100 as proposed. For the participant who has to accept or reject the offer A) The best strategy is to accept any offer which meets the social norm for fairness. B) The best strategy is to threaten to turn down any transfer of less than £100 to ensure that the person receiving the money makes a fair offer. C) There is a dominant strategy to accept any offer because gaining some money is better than gaining no money D) There is a dominant strategy to turn down any offer other than £50 because an unequal split would be unfair.