Kip is trying to decide whether to take a one-day martial arts class at Rex Kwan Do. The fee for the class is $400. Kip will also have to pay his brother Napoleon $150 for that day in return for giving him a ride into town. Instead of taking the class, Kip could spend all day on the computer chatting with his girl, LaFawnduh. This gives him a value of $300. On the other hand, he could spend all day working with his Uncle Rico and making sweet moolah. Uncle Rico has promised to pay him $350 on that day if he works with him. What is Kip’s marginal cost of joining Rex Kwan Do?

Kip is trying to decide whether to take a one-day martial arts class at Rex Kwan Do. The fee for the class is $400. Kip will also have to pay his brother Napoleon $150 for that day in return for giving him a ride into town. Instead of taking the class, Kip could spend all day on the computer chatting with his girl, LaFawnduh. This gives him a value of $300. On the other hand, he could spend all day working with his Uncle Rico and making sweet moolah. Uncle Rico has promised to pay him $350 on that day if he works with him. What is Kip’s marginal cost of joining Rex Kwan Do?

Macroeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617390

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter1: What Economics Is About

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19QP

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