Stephen J. Seagull must decide whether or not to start a new movie project. If he decides not to, he and Clod VandeCamp both get a utility of 10. If he decides to begin the project, both he and Clod must simultaneously decide who the director should be: George Spellbinder, or Ed Tree. If they disagree on the director, the movie isn't made, but both have wasted time, so they get only a utility of 0. If they agree on George Spellbinder, the movie will be a roaring success, and each gets a utility of 20. If they agree on Ed Tree, the movie will be terrible. and they will only get a utility of 5. (a). Draw the extensive form of this game. (b). Write down the normal form. (c). Find all Nash equilibria. (d). Apply the theory of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and state its prodiction

Stephen J. Seagull must decide whether or not to start a new movie project. If he decides not to, he and Clod VandeCamp both get a utility of 10. If he decides to begin the project, both he and Clod must simultaneously decide who the director should be: George Spellbinder, or Ed Tree. If they disagree on the director, the movie isn't made, but both have wasted time, so they get only a utility of 0. If they agree on George Spellbinder, the movie will be a roaring success, and each gets a utility of 20. If they agree on Ed Tree, the movie will be terrible. and they will only get a utility of 5. (a). Draw the extensive form of this game. (b). Write down the normal form. (c). Find all Nash equilibria. (d). Apply the theory of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and state its prodiction

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter6: Consumer Choices

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1SCQ: Jeremy is deeply in love with Jasmine. Jasmine lives where cell phone coverage is poor, so he can...

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Praxilla, who lived in ancient Greece, derives utility from reading poems and from eating cucumbers. Praxilla gets 30 units of marginal utility from her first poem 27 units of marginal utility from her second poem 24 units of marginal utility from her third poem, and so on, with marginal utility declining by three units for each additional poem. Praxilla gets six units of marginal utility for each of her next three cucumbers consumed, five units of marginal utility for each of her next three cucumbers consumed, four units of marginal utility for each of the following three cucumbers consumed, and so on, with marginal utility declining by one for every three cucumber consumed. A poem costs three bronze coins hut a cucumber costs only one bronze coin. Praxilla has 18 bronze coins. Sketch Praxillas budget set between poems and cucumbers, placing poems on the vertical axis and cucumbers on the horizontal axis. Start off with the choice of zero poems and 18 cucumbers, and calculate the changes in marginal utility of moving along the budget line to the next choice of one poem and 15 cucumbers. Using this step-by-step process based on marginal utility, create a table and identify Praxillas utilityâ€”maximizing choice. Compare the marginal utility of the two goods and the relative prices at the optimal choice to see if the expected relationship holds. Hint: Label the table columns: 1) Choice, 2} Marginal Gain from More Poems, 3) Marginal Loss from Fewer Cucumbers, 4) Overall Gain or Loss, 5) Is the previous choice Optimal? Label the table rows: 1) 0 Poems and 18 Cucumbers, 2) 1 Poem and 15 cucumbers, 3) 2 Poems and 12 cucumbers, 4) 3 Poems and 9 Cucumbers, 5) 4 Poems and 6 cucumbers 6) 5 Poems and 3 Cucumbers, 7) 6 Poems and 0 Cucumbers.
Anastasia, Emma, and Greta are deciding what to do on a weekend getaway. They each suggest a first, second, and third choice and then vote on the options. Table 18.2 shows their first, second, and third choice preferences. Explain why they will have a hard time teaching a decision. Does the group prefer mountain biking to canoeing? What about canoeing compared to the beach? What about the beach compared to the original choice of mountain biking?
Jeremy is deeply in love with Jasmine. Jasmine lives where cell phone coverage is poor, so he can either call her on the land-line phone for five cents per minute or he can drive to see her, at a roundâ€”trip cost of 2 in gasoline money. He has a total of 10 per week to spend on staying in touch. To make his preferred choice, Jeremy uses a handy utilimometer that measures his total utility from personal visits and from phone minutes. Using the values in Table 6.6, figure out the points 011 Jeremys consumption choice budget constraint (it may be helpful to do a sketch) and identify his utility-maximizing point.
Suppose the utility possibility frontier for two individuals is given by U_a+2U_b=200 Please plot the utility frontier on a graph.
Let us see the example of Juan and María given but modify their preferences. It is still the case that they are competitive and are deciding whether to show up at their mom’s house at 8:00 A.M., 9:00 A.M., 10:00 A.M., or 11:00 A.M. But now they don’t mind waking up early. Assume that the payoff is 1 if he or she shows up before the other sibling, it is 0 if he or she shows up after the other sibling, and it is 1 if they show up at the same time. The time of the morning does not matter. Find all Nash equilibria.
Please answer all parts it would mean alot. For the rest of this question consider a two goods economy where Kim and Jung can trade Ferraris (good x) and VR headsets (good y) with each other. Kim and Jung both enjoy driving Ferraris and having more VR headsets (so more friends can play the same game). They start at the same (high) level of income. Kim has an initial endowment of (x0k, y0k) = (10,30) and Jung has an initial endowment of (x0j, y0j) = (30,10) a) Illustrate the initial endowment in an Edgeworth box. Clearly label the axes and explain the dimensions of the box. Show the indifference curve each of them is on at the endowment point. b) Consider an allocation where Kim gets (xk, yk) = (40,40) and Jung gets the remaining Ferraris and VR headsets. Show where this point is in the Edgeworth box. Is this allocation Pareto efficient? Is it equitable? How likely is this to arise in practice? c) Assume that Kim has preferences Uk (Xk, Yk) = 3Xk + 3Yk and Jung has…
3. Rick thinks either Morty or Summer broke his TV. Morty and Summer each have to decide simultaneously whether totake the blame or blame the other person. If they both blame the same person (both blame Morty or both blameSummer), the person they blame gets a small punishment and utility of -2, while the blameless person gets a utility of 0.Otherwise (if they both blame the other or both blame themselves), they both get a more severe punishment and autility of -10.a. Draw the normal (matrix) form of this game, with Morty choosing the row and Summer choosing the column.Does either Morty or Summer have a dominant strategy? Explain your answer. Note: only Morty and Summerare players in this Game. Rick designed the game and is not a player. b. Find all Nash equilibria of this game. c. Suppose instead there are three suspects: Morty, Summer, and Jerry. Otherwise, the rules are the same asbefore. Draw the normal (matrix) form of the game. Hint: draw three matrices, with Morty choosing the…
Refer to the Ultimatum Game in Figure 17.7. Recall that the payoffs are monetary payoffs. a. Suppose that players only care about monetary payoffs, with $1 = 1 util. Find the subgame– perfect equilibrium. b. Suppose that players are imperfectly altruistic. They receive 1 util for each dollar they earn but = util for each dollar the other player earns.Write down the extensive form reflecting the new payoffs. Find the subgame–perfect equilibrium. c. Suppose that players are perfectly altruistic, receiving 1 util for each dollar in the sum of their earnings. Write down the extensive form reflecting the new payoffs. Find the subgame– perfect equilibrium. d. Suppose that players are perfectly selfless, getting 1 util for each dollar the other player earns but no utility for their own earnings. Write down the extensive form reflecting the newpayoffs. Find the subgame–perfect equilibrium. Does player 1 end up choosing the outcome that player 2 prefers?…
If Utility =.5lnX++3Z+10+4√W then Marginal utility from W is...
In the movie Rebel Without a Cause, James Dean and Buzz Gunderson compete for thefavours of sixteen year old Judy. Buzz's gang members steal two cars. The group of teenagers gathers on aLos Angeles lookout, with a cliff that drops down to the Pacific Ocean. James and Buzz are to drive the stolencars toward the cliff. The first person to jump from his car is declared the chicken (which is bad). The lastperson to jump is the hero (which is good), capturing Judy's affection and the gang's respect. The driverlesscars continue over the cliff and plunge to the rocks at its base.Each driver can make two possible actions. Jump when he feels endangered (be a chicken) or jump AFTERthe other driver jumps (be a rooster). Assuming that both feel endangered at the same moment, the followingmatrix represents the payoffs for James and Buzz for each choice of strategy.BuzzChicken RoosterJames Chicken 3, 3 -10, 20Rooster 20, -10 -50, -50 PLEASE ANSWER THE BELOW QUESTION WITH REFERECE TO THE ABOVE…
Adam Smith from the Classical School had introduced the “water-diamond paradox” in his Theory of Value. But he did not solve the paradox because he failed to understand the concept of utility. Explain by demonstrating relevant graph how this paradox was solved by William Stanley Jevons from the Marginalist School by using law of diminishing marginal utility.
Suppose that the University of Alabama and Clemson are making spending decisions for theupcoming year. Assume that Alabama is currently spending $15 million on their recruiting andfacilities, and Clemson is spending $10 million. Each team has an additional $5 million to spendor keep as profits. If they both choose to not spend the additional $5 million then Alabama hasa 60% chance of getting the highest quality quarterback recruit to commit to them (getting thecommitment of the player is the goal). However, if they both choose to spend the additional $5million then there is a 57% chance that Alabama gets the high quality quarterback to commit. IfAlabama spends the additional $5 million but Clemson doesn’t then there is a 67% chanceAlabama gets the recruit. However, if Alabama does NOT spend the additional $5million butClemson does then there is a 50% change either team gets the recruit’s commitment. Setup thepayoff matrix and label the players, their strategies, and their payoffs, and…