Let us suppose the market size is 22,218,564 for a self cooking oven. The imitation rate is 0.29 and the innovation rate is 0.006. Recall the Bass Model S-Curve function: n(t) = pm + (q-p)N(t - 1) — qN²(t − 1) m How many new users would there be at time period 2? Let us suppose the market size is 15,343,291 for a self cleaning oven. The innovation parameter is 0.009 and imitation parameter is 0.29. Recall the Bass Model S-Curve function: n(t) = pm + (q-p)N(t-1)- qN²(t-1) m How many total users would there be at the end of time period 2?

Let us suppose the market size is 22,218,564 for a self cooking oven. The imitation rate is 0.29 and the innovation rate is 0.006. Recall the Bass Model S-Curve function: n(t) = pm + (q-p)N(t - 1) — qN²(t − 1) m How many new users would there be at time period 2? Let us suppose the market size is 15,343,291 for a self cleaning oven. The innovation parameter is 0.009 and imitation parameter is 0.29. Recall the Bass Model S-Curve function: n(t) = pm + (q-p)N(t-1)- qN²(t-1) m How many total users would there be at the end of time period 2?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.8P

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