6. Suppose that there are two types of drivers: reckless and safe. Reckless drivershave a higher probability of accidents with an expected loss to the insurancecompany of $5000. Safe drivers have a lower probability of accidents with anexpected loss to the insurance company of $1000. Insurer cannot distinguishbetween reckless and safe drivers but know that reckless drivers make up "B"proportion of all drivers. What single premium should the risk-neutral insurercharge? Assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive. Is the abovementioned problem an example of Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard? Explain.

Insurance is a policy, addressed by an approach, where an individual or element gets monetary…

mpany of 5000. Safe drivers have a lower probability of accidents with óf $: áfé dřivers have a lower prob pected loss to the insurance company of $1000. Insurer cannot distingui ween reckless and safe drivers but know that reckless drivers make up oportion of all drivers. What single premium should the risk-neutral insu arge? Assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive. Is the entioned problem an example of Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard? E>

mpany of 5000. Safe drivers have a lower probability of accidents with óf $: áfé dřivers have a lower prob pected loss to the insurance company of $1000. Insurer cannot distingui ween reckless and safe drivers but know that reckless drivers make up oportion of all drivers. What single premium should the risk-neutral insu arge? Assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive. Is the entioned problem an example of Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard? E>

ECON MICRO

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337000536

Author:William A. McEachern

Publisher:William A. McEachern

Chapter14: Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Information, And Behavioral Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3.8P

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Similar questions

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What is an actuarially fair insurance policy?
How can deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance reduce moral hazard?
18.5 Suppose there is a 50–50 chance that an individual with log- arithmic utility from wealth and with a current wealth of $20,000 will suffer a loss of $10,000 from a car accident. Insur- ance is competitively provided at actuarially fair rates. Compute the outcome if the individual buys full insurance. Compute the outcome if the individual buys only partial insurance covering half the loss. Show that the outcome in part (a) is preferred. Now suppose that individuals who buy the partial rather than the full insurance policy take more care when driv- ing, reducing the damage from loss from $10,000 to $7,000. What would be the actuarially fair price of the partial policy? Does the individual now prefer the full or the partial policy?
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Uncertainty and willingness to pay for insurance. Utility = (Wealth)1/3 Prob(flood) = .04 Prob(no flood) = .96 Total wealth if flood = $100,000. Total Wealth if no flood = $800,000. Find: (i) expected value, (ii) expected utility, (iii) certainty equivalent, and (iv) maximum willingness to pay for a policy that provides 100% flood insurance coverage. Draw the utility function and include all solved values on the diagram. What is the average gross profit per insurance customer, if each customer is charged his own maximum willingness to pay?
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A person's utility function is U = C1/2 . C is the amount of consumption they have in a given period. Their income is $40,000/year and there is a 2% chance that they'll be involved in a catastrophic accident that will cost them $30,000 next year. a. Calculate the actuarially fair insurance premium. What would your expected utility be if you were to purchase the actuarially fair insurance premium? b. What is the most you would be willing to pay for insurance, given your utility function?