n a game, you are given a chance to own 20,000 in $100 banknote denomination. What you need to do is to offer your opponent some amount of money which he is willing to accept, and you have two chances to offer her the amount. If she refuses both of your offers, both of you will leave the game with $0. Assuming that your opponent is rational and she has rejected your first offe what will be your second offer to her?

n a game, you are given a chance to own 20,000 in $100 banknote denomination. What you need to do is to offer your opponent some amount of money which he is willing to accept, and you have two chances to offer her the amount. If she refuses both of your offers, both of you will leave the game with $0. Assuming that your opponent is rational and she has rejected your first offe what will be your second offer to her?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.8P

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