O Consi der Hhe follwing Cournot medel. » The inverse femand funstion is given by p= 30-0 where Q = Et Finm 1s marsimal cost is $6(ai=6). Frm 2 uses a new tachalayy There is no s. that it's mangiual cost ir $3 (c,3). fixed cect * The two fims chonce thir quanti tins simultanecurly and Compete' only Jome). Answer the folloning O Derive Firm 1 md Firm 2i veaition O Solve Hhe Mash equilibium (I", q") O What is He equilibinm price and what is He profit level for eah once. (So its a one- shot simulfanecus questions- fuitions. raspertivab firm.

Exploring Economics
8th Edition
ISBN:9781544336329
Author:Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:Robert L. Sexton
Chapter11: The Firm: Production And Costs
Section: Chapter Questions
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Consi der Hhe fallowing
» The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@
Cournet medel.
where Q = E,+
* Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nem
techaulagy
There is no
that it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3).
fixed cort
So
The fwo fims chooce thair
and Compete only
Jame).
Answer the follming puestions.
O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly.
o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q")
O What is He equilibrinm
level for eah firm.
quenti tias simultaneculy
(So it's a
one- shot simultaneaus
once
price and what is Hhe profit
Suppore there is
Iim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I is
willing to paj for this new
o Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetition
to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all efther
aJAump tins. What is He equilibium price?
O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetition
What is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o milling
for He new feihnly?
* market for the teihue lagy uped by
to
Transcribed Image Text:Consi der Hhe fallowing » The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@ Cournet medel. where Q = E,+ * Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nem techaulagy There is no that it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3). fixed cort So The fwo fims chooce thair and Compete only Jame). Answer the follming puestions. O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly. o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q") O What is He equilibrinm level for eah firm. quenti tias simultaneculy (So it's a one- shot simultaneaus once price and what is Hhe profit Suppore there is Iim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I is willing to paj for this new o Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetition to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all efther aJAump tins. What is He equilibium price? O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetition What is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o milling for He new feihnly? * market for the teihue lagy uped by to
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