One hypothesis for exploring socioeconomic status health disparities hypothesis. This hypothesis states that repeated (or chronic) stress creates a cumulative physiological burden known as allostatic load. The theory predicts that people on the lower end of the socioeconomic status will have a higher allostatic load, negatively impacting health outcomes.In context of the Grossman model, we could say that individuals with lower levels of stress face a rate of health depreciation and will have optimal health as a result. the lower; higher higher; higher lower; lower higher; lower 000

One hypothesis for exploring socioeconomic status health disparities hypothesis. This hypothesis states that repeated (or chronic) stress creates a cumulative physiological burden known as allostatic load. The theory predicts that people on the lower end of the socioeconomic status will have a higher allostatic load, negatively impacting health outcomes.In context of the Grossman model, we could say that individuals with lower levels of stress face a rate of health depreciation and will have optimal health as a result. the lower; higher higher; higher lower; lower higher; lower 000

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter17: Income, Poverty, And Health Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18P

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