Pat's and Geno's are two rival cheesesteak restaurants in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, that are located across the street from each other. Since they serve almost the same food, they are fiercely competitive. With the weather in Philly improving, sales at both firms are expected to increase in the next few months. Suppose both firms are now considering expanding their menu to include cheesecake and other desserts to boost sales further. The payoffs are as follows: Pat's Introduce Desserts Don't Introduce Desserts Вох 1 Вox 2 Introduce Pat's profits will increase by S60,000 Geno's profits will increase by $60,000 Pat's profits will increase by $10,000 Geno's profits will increase by $80,000 Desserts Geno's Don't Вох 3 Вox 4 Introduce Pat's profits will increase by $80,000 Geno's profits will increase by $10,000 Pat's profits will increase by $20,000 Geno's profits will increase by $20,000 Desserts Geno's dominant strategy is to and Pat's dominant strategy is to

Pat's and Geno's are two rival cheesesteak restaurants in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, that are located across the street from each other. Since they serve almost the same food, they are fiercely competitive. With the weather in Philly improving, sales at both firms are expected to increase in the next few months. Suppose both firms are now considering expanding their menu to include cheesecake and other desserts to boost sales further. The payoffs are as follows: Pat's Introduce Desserts Don't Introduce Desserts Вох 1 Вox 2 Introduce Pat's profits will increase by S60,000 Geno's profits will increase by $60,000 Pat's profits will increase by $10,000 Geno's profits will increase by $80,000 Desserts Geno's Don't Вох 3 Вox 4 Introduce Pat's profits will increase by $80,000 Geno's profits will increase by $10,000 Pat's profits will increase by $20,000 Geno's profits will increase by $20,000 Desserts Geno's dominant strategy is to and Pat's dominant strategy is to

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.5P

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