Problem 19 A publishing company has a monopoly in the sales of football cards. According to its estimates, the company's inverse demand function is p = 0.4-0.01q. The company's marginal cost is constant at £0.08. Suppose that the company wants to sell football cards in albums only. Using such a block pricing approach, what will be optimal price that the firm needs to set to maximize its profits? a) £5.12 b) £7.68 c) £2.56 d) £15.36 e) £3.84

Problem 19 A publishing company has a monopoly in the sales of football cards. According to its estimates, the company's inverse demand function is p = 0.4-0.01q. The company's marginal cost is constant at £0.08. Suppose that the company wants to sell football cards in albums only. Using such a block pricing approach, what will be optimal price that the firm needs to set to maximize its profits? a) £5.12 b) £7.68 c) £2.56 d) £15.36 e) £3.84

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter14: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 14.5P

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