Provide a real-world example of third-degree price discrimination (with a hyperlink to the example). Discuss what prevents re-sale in your example (i.e. why can’t people who pay a lower price sell the good to people who face a higher price?). b) Provide a real-world example of a seller offering a “decoy option” (with a hyperlink to the example). Discuss how you expect the demand for the other options to change if this decoy option was removed from the market by the seller.

Provide a real-world example of third-degree price discrimination (with a hyperlink to the example). Discuss what prevents re-sale in your example (i.e. why can’t people who pay a lower price sell the good to people who face a higher price?). b) Provide a real-world example of a seller offering a “decoy option” (with a hyperlink to the example). Discuss how you expect the demand for the other options to change if this decoy option was removed from the market by the seller.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.5IP

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Wonopoly and natural resource prices Suppose that a firm is the sole owner of a stock of a natural resource. a. How should the analysis of the maximization of the discounted profits from selling this resource (Equation 17.63 be modified to take this fact into account? b. Suppose that the demand for the resource in question had a constant elasticity form q(t)=a[p(t)]b . How would this change the price dynamics shown in Equation 17.67? c. How would the answer to Problem 17.7 be changed if the entire crude oil supply were owned by a single firm?
SM 3. Consider the problem of Example 12.4.2. (a) Suppose that Q=f(L) = √L. Write down Eq. (*) in this case and find an explicit expression for L* as a function of P and w. Find the partial derivatives of L* w.r.t. P and w. Then verify the signs obtained in the example. (b) Suppose the profit function is replaced by л(L) = Pf (L) – C(L, w), where C(L, w) is the "cost function". What is the first-order condition for L* to be optimal in this case? Find the partial derivatives of L* w.r.t. P and w.
(a) Is there an arbitrage? Suppose an investment firm sells options. (b) What is the t=0 price (premium) of a call option on stock 2 with exercise price E=12? (c) What is the t=0 price (premium) of a put option on stock 1 with exercise price E=23? Suppose a start-up company wants to go public. The firm has total costs of $100,000 at date t=1 and sales of $120,000 in state 1, $230,000 in state 2, and $140,000 in state 3. The firm wants to issue 1,000 IPO shares. (A share is endowed with a cash flow right of 0.1% of the total profits of the firm.) (d) The underwriter suggests an IPO price of $40 per share. Will this IPO be successful, i.e. will there be a positive demand for the shares?
Q59 Assume that Cronos Group, a nondiscriminating monopolist of cannabis products finds that it can sell its 82nd unit of output for $12. We can surmise that the marginal Multiple Choice revenue of the 82nd unit is less than $12. revenue of the 82nd unit is also $12. revenue of the 82nd unit is greater than $12. cost of the 82nd unit is also $12. cost cannot be calculated from the data given.
Within its first three years, the 2012 Chevy Volt fell in value 62 percent to $12,997 in 2015. And a 2012 Nissan Leaf fell in value 66 percent to $10,220. That’s −22 percent a year, whereas the typical gasoline car depreciates −24, −15, and −12 percent its first three years (51 percent) for a −17 percent average per year. Indeed, at the extreme, a Honda Accord is worth fully 64 percent after three years (−12 percent average per year). Clearly, the steep decline in gasoline prices in 2014 contributed to electric-powered vehicles depreciating recently much faster than gasoline powered vehicles. But hybrid-electric vehicles such as the Nissan Leaf and Chevy Volt and all-electric vehicles such as the Chevy Bolt face another problem as well? 1.) What life cycle cost concept begins raising concerns by year 5 with any electric vehicle (EV)? If that issue affected resale value at year 5, would that affect perceived value-in-use? How exactly?
Suppose that demand for a particular style of handmade Rwandan baskets is Qd = 1700 – 10P. Each basket maker has the following cost function: TCi = 1000 + 50 qi + .1 qi^2. Given this information, find the market outcomes under the various market structures below Multiplant monopoly. Suppose that a local entrepreneur decides to form a single monopoly by acquiring all the firms from part b and operating them as a single company (Each basket maker will still produce using the same cost function, but all the output will be marketed centrally). Now, how much output is produced at each plant (that is, by each basket maker), and how much by the firm as a whole? What is the monopoly price? What is the monopolistâ€™s profit or loss per plant? What is the firmâ€™s overall profit or loss for all 10 plants together? What is MCi and ATCi? What is MR?
Assume you are the Director of Marketing for ABC LTD, a firm that produces a new product called African Light. Your company sells to two distinct geographical markets- Madina and Haatso. ABC LTD is described as a monopolist and has the possibility of discriminating between its Madina and Haatso Markets. In order to derive the maximum profit from the production process, you engaged the services of an Econometrician, who estimated the demand functions for both Madina and Haatso to be: Q1 = 24 – 0.2P1 Madina Q2 = 10 – 0.05P2 Haatso Where Q1 and Q2 are the respective quantities of African Light demanded in the Madina and Haatso markets and P1 and P2 are their respective prices (in GH¢). If the Total Cost (TC) of ABC LTD for producing African Light for these two markets is given as TC = 35 + 40Q, where Q =Q1 +Q2. i. What profit will ABC LTD make with and without price discrimination? ii. What business advice will you give in respect of practicing price discrimination or selling a…
Q56 A Nash equilibrium is an outcome... a. Achieved by cooperation between players in the game. b. That is achieved by collusion where no party has an incentive to change their behaviour. c. Where each player's strategy depends on the behaviour of its opponents. d. That is achieved when players in the game have jointly maximized profits and divided those profits according to market share of each player. e. Where each player's best strategy is to maintain its present behaviour given the present behaviour of the other players.
Q6. Which is CORRECT about information asymmetry and adverse selection a. Information asymmetry refers to the situation when buyers have more information on the product than the sellers. b. Information asymmetry is the result of adverse selection. c. In a used car market, if sellers with good cars are unwilling to sell at a large discount, then only bad cars will get sold. This suboptimal outcome is so-called “adverse selection”. d. Due to information asymmetry, market investors interpret firm’s SEO announcement positively because they believe insiders consider the firm undervalued.
Semi-Salt Industries began its operation in 1975 and remains the only firm in the world that produces and sells commercial-grade polyglutamate. While virtually anyone with a degree in college chemistry could replicate the firm’s formula, due to the relatively high cost, Semi-Salt has decided not to apply for a patent. Despite the absence of patent protection, Semi-Salt has averaged accounting profits of 5.5 percent on investment since it began producing polyglutamate—a rate comparable to the average rate of interest that large banks paid on deposits over this period. Do you think Semi-Salt is earning monopoly profits? Why?
Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport (YNG) has had a difficult time securing passenger service from a commercial airline. a.) A few years ago, the Port Authority offered an incentive to United with guaranteed revenue equal to approximately $1.5 million, but United declined saying it was not sufficient. Suppose United anticipated that it would cost $1 million to offer flights from Youngstown, so with a guaranteed revenue of $1.5 million, their anticipated profit would equal $500,000. Given that they still chose to decline offering service from YNG, what do you know must be true? Put this in terms of implicit costs and economic profit. b.) In 2019, YNG’s only commercial carrier, Allegiant Air stopped offering service from YNG, despite the fact that it was known to be profitable. Allegiant Air’s service from YNG was known to be profitable. Why would Allegiant Air pull service from YNG even if it had been their service from YNG had been generating a profit? Note, Allegiant started…
LalaFast 21 is a major carrier based in the Philippines and has made a strategy of cutting fares drastically on certain routes with large effects on traffic in those markets. For example, on the Baguio-Cubao route the entry of LalaFast into the market caused average fares to fall by 48 per cent and increased market revenue from P21,327,008 to P47,064,782 annually. On the Tuguegarao-Caloocan route, however, the average fare cut in the market when LalaFaST entered was 70 per cent and market revenue fell from an annual P66,201,553 to P33,101,514.Questions1. Calculate the PEDs for the Baguio-Cubao route and Tuguegarao-Caloocan route.2. Explain why the above market elasticities might not apply specifically to Lalafast 21.3. If LalaFast 21 does experience a highly elastic demand on the Baguio-Cubao route, what is the profit implication of this?4. Explain why the fare reduction on the Tuguegarao-Caloocan route a profitable strategy for LalaFast may still be.