Question 3 A certain household comprises of a couple, Adam (A) and Betty (B). They have exicographic preferences over two goods G1 and G2 - A wants to consume as much of G1 as possible, before moving on to G2 whereas, for B, it is the opposite, she wants to consume as much of G2 as possible before moving on to G1.¹ Given their varying preferences, they decide to shop separately, after dividing the household income equally. The household income is $8. One difference to the usual setting - there are government restrictions in place so that no individual s allowed to buy more than two units of either good. Hint: Do not use mathematical brute force (like Calculus) to solve this problem. A simple diagram with appropriate budget lines, etc. should suffice. 1) Suppose prices are p= (p₁, p2) = (1, 2). Denote the optimal choice of A and B as a = (a₁, a2) and b= (b₁,b₂) respectively. Solve for a and b.

Question 3 A certain household comprises of a couple, Adam (A) and Betty (B). They have exicographic preferences over two goods G1 and G2 - A wants to consume as much of G1 as possible, before moving on to G2 whereas, for B, it is the opposite, she wants to consume as much of G2 as possible before moving on to G1.¹ Given their varying preferences, they decide to shop separately, after dividing the household income equally. The household income is $8. One difference to the usual setting - there are government restrictions in place so that no individual s allowed to buy more than two units of either good. Hint: Do not use mathematical brute force (like Calculus) to solve this problem. A simple diagram with appropriate budget lines, etc. should suffice. 1) Suppose prices are p= (p₁, p2) = (1, 2). Denote the optimal choice of A and B as a = (a₁, a2) and b= (b₁,b₂) respectively. Solve for a and b.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.2IP

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