Question 3 Carl and Simon are two pumpkin growers who are the only sellers of pumpkins at the market. The demand function for pumpkins is Q = 1,800 – 400P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins. Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $.50 for each pumpkin produced. Assume that Carl can tell, by looking at Simon's fields, how many pumpkins Simon planted and how many Simon will harvest in the fall. (Suppose that Simon will sell every pumpkin that he produces.) Therefore, Carl sees how many pumpkins Simon is actually going to sell this year. Carl has this information before he makes his own decision about how many to plant. If Simon plants enough pumpkins to yield Q, this year, then Carl knows that the profit maximising amount to produce this year is QCarl = O 1,800 – 400QS- O 1,800 – 800QS- 800 – Qs/2. O 400 – Qs/2. O 1,200 – Qs-

Question 3 Carl and Simon are two pumpkin growers who are the only sellers of pumpkins at the market. The demand function for pumpkins is Q = 1,800 – 400P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins. Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $.50 for each pumpkin produced. Assume that Carl can tell, by looking at Simon's fields, how many pumpkins Simon planted and how many Simon will harvest in the fall. (Suppose that Simon will sell every pumpkin that he produces.) Therefore, Carl sees how many pumpkins Simon is actually going to sell this year. Carl has this information before he makes his own decision about how many to plant. If Simon plants enough pumpkins to yield Q, this year, then Carl knows that the profit maximising amount to produce this year is QCarl = O 1,800 – 400QS- O 1,800 – 800QS- 800 – Qs/2. O 400 – Qs/2. O 1,200 – Qs-

Economics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)

16th Edition

ISBN:9781305506725

Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Publisher:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Chapter24: Price-searcher Markets With High Entry Barriers

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9CQ

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Carl and Simon are two pumpkin growers who are the only sellers of pumpkins at the market. The demand function for pumpkins is Q = 16,400 - 400P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins. Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $1 for each pumpkin produced. Assume that Carl can tell, by looking at Simon's fields, how many pumpkins Simon planted and how many Simon will harvest in the fall. (Suppose that Simon will sell every pumpkin that he produces.) Therefore, Carl sees how many pumpkins Simon is actually going to sell this year. Carl has this information before he makes his own decision about how many to plant. If Simon plants enough pumpkins to yield Qs this year, then Carl knows that the profit maximising amount to produce this year is QCarl = Group of answer choices a. 8,000 - Qs/2. b. 16,400 - 400Qs. c. 16,400 - 800Qs. d. 4,000 - Qs/2. e. 12,000 - Qs
Carl and Simon are two pumpkin growers who are the only sellers of pumpkins at the market. The demand function for pumpkins is Q = 8,400 - 800P, where Q is the total number of pumpkins that reach the market and P is the price of pumpkins. Suppose further that each farmer has a constant marginal cost of $.50 for each pumpkin produced. If Carl believes that Simon is going to produce Qs pumpkins this year, then the reaction function tells us how many pumpkins Carl should produce in order to maximize his profits. Carl’s reaction function is QCarl = Group of answer choices a. 2,000 - Qs/2. b. 8,400 - 800Qs. c. 8,400 - 1,600Qs. d. 4,000 - Qs/2. e. 6,000 - Qs.
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