Question: find all NEs (mixed and pure, eliminating dominated actions when finding equilibria) Player 2 M R 2,2 3,1 0,3 1,0 Player 1 1,2 в 0,2 Find all Nash equilibriums (mixed and pure) in the above game. Hint: Note that in a Nash equilibrium, a strictly dominated action is played with zero probability. Thus, if there is a strictly dominated action, it can be eliminated, and then the NEs can be calculated in the "smaller" game.
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- (a) Find all the Nash Equilibria, if there is any. (no explanation needed for this part (b) Does player 1 (choosing rows) have any dominant action? If yes, which action(s)? Any dominated action(s)? If yes, which ones? Answer the same questions for player 2, too. (c) If player 1 moves first (and player 2 moves next), what would be the sequentially rational equilibrium (draw the game tree and use backward induction)?What if player 2 moves first (and then player 1 moves next)? (d) Looking at your findings in (c), would player 1 want to move first or second or is she indifferent (the order doesn’t matter)?Nn3 Suppose an incumbent monopoly firm currently earns a profit of $50,000 per period. A potential entrant could enter and make a profit of $15,000 per period while also lowering the incumbent’s profit to $20,000 per period. The monopoly firm could seek to engage in predatory pricing, which would lead to both firms earning a loss of $5,000 per period. (a) Is there a Nash Equilibrium in this game? If so, what is it? (b) Discuss how this game might play out in the real world?A game is played as follows: First Player 1 decides (Y or N) whether or not to play.If she chooses N, the game ends. If she chooses Y, then Player 2 decides (Y or N) whetheror not to play. If he chooses N the game ends. If he chooses Y, then they go ahead and playanother game with the payoffs shown below. A player who opts out by choosing N gets 2 andthe other player gets 0. Draw the tree of this game and then find the two subgame-perfect Nashequilibria.
- 5.Each of Player 1 and Player 2 chooses an integer from the set {1, 2, ..., K}. If they choose the same integer, P1 gets +1 and P2 gets -1; if they choose different integers, P1 gets -1 and P2 gets +1. (a) Show that it is a NE for each player to choose every integer in {1, 2, ..., K} with equal probability, K1 . (b) Show that there are no NE besides the one you found in (a).We’ll now show how a college degree can get you a better job even if itdoesn’t make you a better worker. Consider a two-player game between aprospective employee, whom we’ll refer to as the applicant, and an employer. The applicant’s type is her intellect, which may be low, moderate,or high, with probability 1/3 , 1/2 , and 1/6 , respectively. After the applicantlearns her type, she decides whether or not to go to college. The personalcost in gaining a college degree is higher when the applicant is less intelligent, because a less smart student has to work harder if she is to graduate. Assume that the cost of gaining a college degree is 2, 4, and 6 for an applicant who is of high, moderate, and low intelligence, respectively.The employer decides whether to offer the applicant a job as a manageror as a clerk. The applicant’s payoff to being hired as a manager is 15,while the payoff to being a clerk is 10. These payoffs are independent ofthe applicant’s type. The employer’s payoff from…a) Find the Nash equilibria in the game (in pure and mixed strategies) and the associated payoffs for the players. b) Now assume that the game is extended in the following way: in the beginning Player 1 can decide whether to opt out (this choice is denoted by O) or whether to play the simultaneous-move game in a) (this choice is denoted by G). If Player 1 opts out (plays O) then both Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of 4 each and the game ends. If Player 1 decides to play G, then the simultaneous-move game is played. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this extended version of the game. (Hint: note that Player 1 now has 4 strategies and write the game up in a 4x2 matrix.) c) Write the game in (b) up in extensive form (a game tree). Identify the subgames of this game.
- Consider the following coordination game: Player 2P1 Comedy Show Concert Comedy Show 11,5 0,0 Concert 0,0 2,2 a. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) for this game.b. Now assume Player 1 and Player 2 have distributional preferences. Specifically, both people greatly care about the utility of the other person. In fact, they place equal weight on their outcome and the other person’soutcome, ρ = σ = ½. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) with these utilitarianpreferences.c. Now consider the case where Player1 and Player2 do not like each other. Specifically, any positive outcome for the other person is viewed as anegative outcome for the individual, ρ = σ = -1. Find the Nashequilibrium(s) with these envious preferences.Q17. What the information sets in the above game denote? Player 2 does not observe the action of player 1, so he does not know in which decision node he/she is playing at. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and b, or one between c and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played one between a and c, or one between b and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and d, or one between b and c.Q17. What the information sets in the above game denote? Player 2 does not observe the action of player 1, so he does not know in which decision node he/she is playing at. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and b, or one between c and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played one between a and c, or one between b and d. Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and d, or one between b and c. Q18. If we want to describe the above game with a strategic form representation, what would the strategy sets for the three players? Player 1={a, b, c, d} ; Player 2={x, y} Player 1={a, b, c, d} ; Player 2={xx, xy, yx, yy}
- on 8.1 Consider the following game: Player 1 A C D 7,6 5,8 0,0 Player 2 E 5,8 7,6 1, 1 F 0,0 1,1 4,4 a. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). b. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just the first two actions. c. Compute players' expected payoffs in the equilibria found in parts (a) and (b). d. Draw the extensive form for this game.Consider the game of Chicken in which each player has the option to “get out of the way” and “hang tough” with payoffs: Get out of the way Hang tough Get out of the way 2,2 1,3 Hang tough 3,1 00 a. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if they exist b. Let k be the probability that player 1 chooses “hang tough” and u be the probability that player two chooses “hang tough.” Find the mixed stragety Nash equilibria, if they existConsider the extensive form game portrayed below. The top number at aterminal node is player 1’s payoff, the middle number is player 2’s payoff,and the bottom number is player 3’s payoff.a. Derive the strategy set for each player. (Note: If you do not want to listall of the strategies, you can provide a general description of a player’sstrategy, give an example, and state how many strategies are in thestrategy set.)b. Derive all subgame perfect Nash equilibria. c. Derive a Nash equilibrium that is not a SPNE, and explain why it isnot a SPNE.