r of rare antique books wants to sell a book from her collection on eBay. Disc ving decisions, considering the characteristics of the item for sale and d market for this item: en offering the book in a regular auction, what should the start price of the auct en offering the book at a fixed posted price, would the optimal posted price ve or below the optimal start price of an auction in part (a)? uld the item be offered in a regular auction or at a fixed posted price?

r of rare antique books wants to sell a book from her collection on eBay. Disc ving decisions, considering the characteristics of the item for sale and d market for this item: en offering the book in a regular auction, what should the start price of the auct en offering the book at a fixed posted price, would the optimal posted price ve or below the optimal start price of an auction in part (a)? uld the item be offered in a regular auction or at a fixed posted price?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.10P

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